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Abstract
The purpose of the thesis is to analyse the management of various forms of 
risk that affect entire insurance portfolios and thus cannot be eliminated by 
increasing the number of policies, like catastrophes, financial market events 
and fluctuating insurance risk conditions. Three distinct frameworks are 
employed.
First, we study the optimal design of a catastrophe-related index that an 
insurance company may use to hedge against catastrophe losses in the 
incomplete market. The optimality is understood in terms of minimising 
the remaining risk as proposed by Follmer and Schweizer. We compare 
seven hypothetical indices for an insurance industry comprising several 
companies and obtain a number of qualitative and formula-based results in 
a doubly stochastic Poisson model with the intensity of the shot-noise type.
Second, with a view to the emergence of mortality bonds in life insurance 
and longevity bonds in pensions, the design of a mortality-related derivative 
is discussed in a Markov chain environment. We consider longevity in a 
scenario where specific causes of death are eliminated at random times due 
to advances in medical science. It is shown that bonds with payoff related 
to the individual causes of death are superior to bonds based on broad 
mortality indices, and in the presence of only one cause-specific derivative 
its design does not affect the hedging error. For one particular mortality 
bond linked to two causes of death, we calculate the hedging error and 
study its dependence on the design of the bond.
Finally, we study Pareto-optimal risk exchanges between a group of 
insurance companies. The existing one-period theory is extended to the 
multiperiod and continuous cases. The main result is that every 
multiperiod or continuous Pareto-optimal risk exchange can be reduced to
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the one-period case, and can be constructed by pre-setting the ratios of the 
marginal utilities between the group members.
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Summary
More than a decade has passed since the infamous Hurricane Andrew hit 
Florida in August 1992 and caused about $18 billion in insured losses. It 
served as a wake up call for the whole insurance industry and initiated the 
integration of the financial and insurance markets. One of the primary 
goals in the insurance industry since then was finding better ways of 
catastrophe risk securitization. However, the consequences of Hurricane 
Katrina, which hit the United States in August 2005 and was responsible 
for over $80 billion in damages, provided evidence that insurance companies 
remain vulnerable to catastrophe risk. The losses were so severe that, 
subsequently, Standard & Poor’s placed 10 insurance companies on 
CreditWatch negative. The list included such insurance giants as ACE, 
Allstate Corp., Swiss Re, and losses ranged from $25 billion to $60 billion 
(CreditSights (2005)).
This state of affairs provided motivation for our research on optimal ways of 
redistribution of insurance risk. We consider two major types of insurable 
risk. The first one is the "high-severity, low-frequency" catastrophe risk, 
associated with jumps in human and property losses. On the other side of 
the scale is longevity risk which became relatively recently recognized as a 
serious threat to the life insurance industry. Overestimation of future 
mortality rates in the last two decades has caused serious problems to many 
insurance companies and pension funds.
We consider two strategies that insurance company may use for 
securitization. The first one involves transferring part of the insurance risk 
to the financial market and suggests that the company trades a 
catastrophe-based index of a specified form. Mortality bonds in insurance 
and longevity bonds in pensions provide an example of transferring 
mortality risk to the capital market. Unit-linked insurance contracts with
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guarantee (e.g., guaranteed annuity options) provide an example of the 
contract that combines actuarial and financial risks. The second strategy is 
endogenous in the sense that it does not attract the resources of the 
financial market and implies co-operating with other insurance companies 
to form a risk-exchange group and undertake an attempt to lighten the 
burden of liabilities by exchanging parts of the members’ risks. The 
risk-sharing rules are determined by the companies’ utility functions that 
reflect their attitudes towards risk.
In Chapter 1 of the thesis, we present an overview of the evolution of the 
insurance-linked derivatives, followed by a survey of the recent 
developments in the area of optimization of the design of the securities.
In Chapter 2 , we focus on the problem of finding the optimal loss-based 
index using the criterion of risk-minimization as proposed by Follmer and 
Sondermann (1986). We consider an insurance industry of n companies 
working in the same line of insurance business. We suppose that a 
loss-linked tradeable index is launched, and selling this index will help an 
insurance company to offset part of their potential catastrophic losses. 
Seven hypothetical indices are examined, some depending on the total 
losses within the industry and others based on the number of claims. Also, 
an insurance-independent severity index, reflecting the severity of the 
catastrophe, is considered. We assume that the companies’ losses are 
triggered by the same catastrophic events, and also depend on the size of 
the company and on the specific exposure for each company and each 
catastrophic event. The loss distribution in consideration is a doubly 
stochastic Poisson distribution with shot-noise intensity. The value for the 
hedging error in each case is obtained. Next we compare the results for the 
seven indices in question and find the optimal one. At the end of that 
section, we point out how our results can be applied to the case of extreme 
rainfall and earthquake models.
Chapter 3 uses the same idea of minimizing the quadratic hedging error for 
a different type of risk, but in a new framework. We examine several ways 
of hedging mortality risk in a Markov chain economic-demographic 
environment adopting an approach proposed by Norberg (2007). First,
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various causes of death are considered; jumps in mortality are linked to 
elimination or emergence of such causes. The mortality rates can be 
modelled by a Markov chain, and one can hedge mortality risk by trading 
suitable mortality-linked securities. In our first example, we compare the 
hedging error associated with trading two cause-specific bonds to hedging 
with a bond whose payment process depends on existence of either of the 
two death causes. The optimal design of this bond is obtained with the help 
of a computer program for some specific values of the parameters. The 
interest rate in this model is taken as constant. The risk-minimizing values 
of the parameters are obtained, and sensitivity to variations in the internal 
and external parameters is studied.
The rest of the thesis (Chapter 4) deals with an alternative approach to 
redistribution of risk. It involves the concept of Pareto-optimal risk 
exchanges (POREX) and the utility theory. As in Chapter 2 , the market 
consists of n insurance companies. Their risk preferences are described by 
their utility functions. In the well-studied one-period model, the 
Pareto-optimal risk exchange is the treaty which cannot be replaced by 
another risk exchange agreement such that the expected utility of at least 
one agent will increase and the expected utilities of the rest of the group 
will not be diminished. One of the main results provides necessary and 
sufficient conditions for such risk exchanges. We extended the theory to the 
multiperiod and continuous set-ups and have proved that, with some 
limitations, the multiperiod Pareto-optimal risk exchanges should satisfy 
necessary and sufficient conditions similar to those in one-period case. In 
the continuous-time setting the main result states that the Pareto-optimal 
risk exchange can be reduced to the one-period case, and can be constructed 
by pre-setting the ratios of the marginal utilities between the group 
members.
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Chapter 1. Introduction to the insurance of catastrophe 
risk
In this chapter, we will trace the development and the recent achievements 
in the market for insurance risk. In Section 1.1, the milestones of this 
process are surveyed, and in Section 1.2 we review the research literature 
on optimal design of a catastrophe index.
1.1 Background
Catastrophes are now defined by Property Claim Services (PCS), the 
insurance industry’s statistical agent, as events that cause $25 billion or 
more in direct insured losses to property and that affect a significant 
number of policyholders and insurers. Catastrophe losses caused by natural 
disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, wind- and hailstorms, floods 
and other perils, have been traditionally insured by the property and 
casualty insurance industry. Until the early nineties, direct insurers used 
to buy catastrophe protection from reinsurers. With better capitalization 
and better-diversified portfolios, the reinsurers are expected to absorb more 
risk more efficiently. However, it became evident after Hurricane Andrew, 
which hit Florida in August 1992, caused about $18 billion in insured losses 
and left at least 11 primary insurers insolvent, that traditional reinsurance 
is no longer capable of coping with potential mega-catastrophes.
In the wake of this disaster, reinsurers tried to re-evaluate their risks, and, 
consequently, reinsurance prices rose significantly (more than doubled in 
some areas), preventing primary insurers from buying adequate 
reinsurance protection at affordable prices. After 1994, the global 
reinsurance rates began to fall, almost reaching their 1992-level by 1999
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(Pollner (2001)). Nevertheless, major global reinsurers admitted that 
catastrophe coverage was inadequate in many parts of the world, and that a 
resolution to this problem should come from the financial market. Pollner 
(2001) argued that "the capital market capacity stands at approximately 
$42 trillion or close to 50 times the capital available from the insurance 
industry, estimated at $850 billion". Inventing mutually advantageous 
ways of channelling insurance risk to the investors became an issue of vital 
importance. The solution came in the form of insurance-linked securities 
(ILS), which can be traded on a stock exchange and whose payout depends 
on the occurrence of a specified insurance event. These securities were 
intended to fill the gap between the insurance and the financial market.
Swiss Re (1999) describes three factors that might catalyze the integration 
of the insurance and finance. Apart from the well-tested first one, which is 
the occurrence of a new major catastrophe or a series of catastrophes, a 
downfall in the financial market itself might be beneficial. As Swiss Re 
(1999) puts it, "investors, whose expectations have been coloured by an 
extraordinary 15-year bull market in US equities, would grow disillusioned, 
reduce their equity holdings, and look elsewhere for the new investment 
opportunities". To some extent, this is exactly what has happened, 
although in the fixed income market, as bond yields have come down to 
historically low levels in the recent years. The third factor to accelerate the 
development of the ILS market would be an increased participation of the 
credit rating agencies and favourable regulatory treatment. Rating 
agencies’ involvement will lead to the standardisation of deals and 
increased transparency, enabling investors to compare the risks between 
ILS as well as those between ILS and purely financial securities. On the 
regulation side, investors would welcome a more relaxed tax regime. We 
would also add that availablility of good pricing models and research in the 
area will make the investors more confident when taking this sort of risk.
However, there are several good features of the ILS that should, sooner or 
later, and despite the initial suspicion of the financial market players, make 
them an attractive investment. First, it may offer investors a good 
diversification instrument: zero-beta assets with a possibility of high 
returns. Empirical analysis provides evidence that the occurrence of
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catastrophic events is uncorrelated with price movements of stocks and 
bonds. For example, Canter et al (1997) studied the relationship between 
the yearly percentage changes in the S&P500 Index and in the PCS 
national index using data from 1949 to 1996. The correlation coefficient 
they obtained was insignificantly different from zero. However, as the 
catastrophes become more frequent and more severe in the third 
millennium, and affect greater regions (as, for example, the flood in Europe 
in August 2002), the question of uncorrelatedness between the occurrence of 
a natural catastrophe and the general movement of the stock prices may 
deserve further investigation. One cannot neglect a possible situation when 
a new catastrophe or a sequence affects several countries and paralyses 
their economies for a while, thus tying together catastrophe and financial 
market losses.
The second incentive is ILS’ good risk/return characteristics. According to 
Froot (2001), actual spread at issue over LIBOR of the USAA/Residential Re 
1997 transaction was 576 basis points, well above the estimated expected 
loss of only 63 basis points. Part of the reason for such mispricing is 
perhaps a relatively low level of competition on the demand side, due to the 
lack of skills and experience (unlike those for dealing with corporate 
defaults) as well as a possibility of losing all the capital without any 
recovery value. Also interesting is the fact that insurance companies seem 
willing to pay those rates. Froot (2001) analyses several possible
explanations, looking mainly at supply-side issues such as lack of 
reinsurance capital and various imperfections of such a market. In any 
event, these circumstances seem likely to change only slowly, keeping such 
instruments attractive. The recent global liquidity contraction will be an 
interesting test of insurance companies’ appetite for CAT bond issuance 
given higher risk premiums elsewhere. Another way of looking at the 
risk/return profile of such instruments is their Sharpe ratio. Indeed, 
according to Swiss Re (2003), Sharpe ratios for catastrophe (CAT) bonds 
were well above that for, for example, BB-rated corporate bonds. When one 
considers optimal portfolio construction, allocating a small percentage of the 
portfolio to such assets with a high Sharpe ratio and low correlation with 
the rest of the portfolio allows to increase expected portfolio return while 
reducing, or keeping the same, return volatility.
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So while the fundamental reasons for launching such securities are sound, 
the reality was not that straightforward. It took time to put all the pieces in 
place, and, back in the early nineties, the conditions were far from perfect. 
In December 1992, the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) began to trade CAT 
futures and options on futures. Both types of securities were based on the 
loss ratio index of Insurance Service Office (ISO), settled on loss data from a 
number of selected companies. The ISO index was calculated as the total 
loss ratio of these companies. This first attempt was unsuccessful. "The 
reasons were that the index was announced only once before the settlement 
date, there was information asymmetry between insurers and investors, 
and there was a lack of realistic models", explain Christensen and Schmidli 
(2000).
Next followed PCS options and call spreads in 1995. The underlying index 
for the options was estimated and published daily. The CBOT’s call spreads 
settled on indices of industry-wide catastrophic property losses in various 
regions of the USA. The loss indices were compiled by Property Claim 
Services. There were nine indices: a national index, five regional indices, 
and three state indices (for California, Florida, and Texas). The indices 
were based on PCS estimates of catastrophic property losses in the specified 
geographic areas during quarterly or annual exposure periods. But, 
according to Sheehan (2003), "the volume of PCS index option contracts 
peaked at only 15,706 contracts in 1997 and declined to 561 contracts in 
1999. The CBOT has since delisted these options because of a lack of 
interest". Swiss Re (2001) certified that in a survey on the use of CAT 
options, only 5% of managers polled reported actually using them, with the 
main reason for remaining cautious being "the lack of market liquidity and 
the view that derivatives were risky and might lead to increased regulatory 
oversight, ... there was uncertainty regarding the design and use of these 
derivatives, ... lack of qualified personnel, the need to educate 
management." In 1998, the annual volume of CAT risk securitisation 
reached $1.4 billion and then fell to $1 billion in 1999 (Swiss Re (2001)).
However, a new wave of growth in the market has already started, 
beginning in Europe this time, with the emergence of the first CAT bond.
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As far as the mechanics of the transaction goes, capital raised by issuing 
CAT bonds is invested in safe securities such as Treasury bonds which are 
held by a single-purpose reinsurer to insulate investors from the credit risk 
of the bond issuer. The bond issuer holds a call option on the funds in the 
single-purpose reinsurer. If the defined event occurs, the bond issuer can 
withdraw funds from the reinsurer to pay claims, and part or all of the 
interest and/or principal payments are forgiven. If the defined catastrophic 
event does not occur, the investors receive their principal plus interest 
equal to the risk-free rate plus a premium.
The first CAT bond, the Winterthur convertible bond, was issued in 1997 in 
Switzerland. It was a three-year bond with a possibility of conversion into 
five Winterthur Insurance registered shares at maturity. The face value 
was C h f  4,700, and coupons were at risk. The trigger event was the 
occurrence of a hailstorm resulting in 6,000 or more claims (from Schmock 
(1999)). Four other CAT bonds were launched in the same year, and, in 
2003 the total amount of outstanding ILS reached $4.3 billion (Swiss Re 
(2004)). In 2006, the total volume of ILS outstanding almost reached $23 
billion. According to Swiss Re (2006a), "of this, two-thirds or $15 billion are 
life bonds, and the remaining $8 billion non-life, ... insurers and investors 
increasingly benefit from these new opportunities. Since total bonds 
outstanding are still just a small fraction of the potential market, issuance 
is likely to see strong growth going forward". In the total, according to Guy 
Carpenter (2007), in the past decade, "97 transactions have been completed, 
representing $15.35 billion in catastrophe bond issue". Thirty eight of them 
took place in years 2005-2006, reflecting an increase of activity in the 
market. The risk profile of the market has expanded as well, now including 
both unrated issues and those rated from B to AA (Guy Carpenter (2007)).
Even though more than half of the total CAT bond issuance since 1997 
covers hurricane and earthquake risk in the US, the geographic scope of the 
CAT bond coverage continues to grow. According to Guy Carpenter (2007), 
about 10% of all amount in the last 10 years covers typhoon and earthquake 
risk in Japan, 9% are linked to hail and windstorm in Europe, and the 
proportion of multiple intercontinental risk is also growing and has reached 
26% in years 2005-2006. New regions have launched CAT bonds recently:
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Taiwan earthquake bond in 2003, Australia multiperil bond and Mexico 
earthquake bond in 2006. Even some of the abandoned ILS securities have 
now been revived. In March 2007, NYMEX resumed trading PCS risk 
futures and options contracts, based on PCS data compiled for one of three 
regions - a Nationwide index, Texas-Maine index or Florida property 
insurance claims.
CAT-risk securities are a particularly interesting example of a new type of 
derivatives where the underlying is not a traded asset or commodity and 
therefore has no directly observable price which could determine the price of 
the derivative. In this sense, CAT securities are analogous to other new 
derivatives with "exotic underlying", such as weather derivatives.
According to the Swiss Re (2003) report, CAT bonds can use a number of 
trigger mechanisms. The simplest are indemnity-based transactions which 
are linked to the company’s own losses. In order to improve transparency, 
either index or modelled loss triggers can be used. The most transparent 
one relies on parametric or physical triggers, i.e., a measure of the severity 
of a catastrophe. The most popular one, accounting to about 60% of all 
outstanding notional, is the parametric index that adjusts the parametric 
trigger for the particular company, thus combining transparency with a 
closer match to the company’s business and coverage mix. A recent trend 
gaining popularity is a hybrid trigger that uses two or more trigger types in 
a single transaction.
In addition to the (relatively) standardised marketable products such as 
CAT bonds, a large number of transactions is done in the 
principal-to-principal format. This allows for more precise tailoring of the 
terms to suit both parties. Because the parties and their preferences are 
known, utility curves can be used to quantify their return requirements and 
risk tolerance. These can then be combined into an optimal transaction 
design using the Pareto optimality concept. Optimality, according to the 
latter, is the state when neither party’s utility can be increased without 
reducing the utility of the other party.
Catastrophes affect not only property insurance but the life insurance sector
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as well. In 2005, the worst catastrophe in terms of victims was the 
earthquake (magnitude 7.6) in Kashmir, taking the lives of some 73,300 
people (Swiss Re (2006b)). One can think of catastrophic events solely 
within the life insurance sector, without association with natural disasters, 
like an outbreak of cholera or a pandemic flu. The first security of this type 
was launched by Swiss Re in December 2003. According to Cox and Lin 
(2006), it was a three-year catastrophe bond with principal exposed to 
mortality risk, defined in terms of an index based on the weighted average 
annual mortality rates in the US, UK, Italy, Switzerland and France. The 
principal was reduced proportionally to the change in index as compared to 
its initial value and was abandoned completely if this ratio had reached 1.5. 
Total coverage was $400 million. Since then, such "death bonds" have 
become increasingly popular. Goldstein (2007) reports that "in 2005 about 
$10 billion worth were transacted, ... and this number rose to $15 billion in 
2006, and could double this year. Over the next few decades ... the face 
value of life settlement deals will top $160 billion a year in today’s dollars".
Another relatively new risk associated with the mortality rates is the 
longevity risk. It results from higher-than-expected payout ratios stemming 
from a decrease in mortality rates among pensioners and other 
policyholders with survival benefits. The policies most exposed to longevity 
risk are those with a guarantee. This tendency was first spotted in 1990s, 
and soon the need for a mechanism of hedging against such risk became 
apparent. The solution came in the form of a mortality-linked derivative, 
and the pioneering product was the long-term longevity bond, issued by 
EIB/BNP in November 2004. This bond was only partially subscribed and 
later called back due to a variety of problems with its design (see, for 
example, Cox and Lin (2006), Cairns et al (2006b), Antolin and 
Blommenstien (2007)). But Cairns et al (2006b) believed that "these 
implementation difficulties are essentially teething problems which will be 
resolved over time, and so leave the way open to the development of 
flourishing markets in a brand new class of securities".
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1.2 In search of optimality
Quite a few attempts have been undertaken to design optimal, under some 
criteria, CAT derivatives. To date, most of the analyses have been based on 
historical data. For example, Cummins, Lalonde, Phillips (2000) compared 
indices with different geographic scope. They conducted a simulation 
analysis of hedging effectiveness for 255 insurers in Florida for each of five 
indices: one statewide and four intra-state regional indices. Three hedging 
objectives have been investigated: reduction in loss variance, value-at-risk 
(VAR) and the expected loss conditional on losses exceeding a specified loss 
threshold. The authors found that the firms with large enough market 
shares can hedge almost as effectively using intra-state index contracts as 
they can by using perfect-hedge contracts, such as when the company’s own 
losses are used as the index. Hedging with the statewide contracts, on the 
other hand, is effective only for insurers with the largest state market 
shares and insurers that are highly diversified throughout the state.
J.Major (1999) indicated that one of the major shortcomings in hedges based 
on indices is the low correlation of a particular insurer’s losses with the 
index (called basis risk). He considered a smaller scale (as compared to 
Cummins, Lalonde and Phillips), compared zip-based hedge of one-event 
hurricane risk to the statewide hedge in nine USA states using Monte-Carlo 
simulation, and explored the effect of insurer market penetration on basis 
risk. He studied two cases: conditional on event and the unconditional one. 
He has found out that the correlation between the statewide index and the 
insurer’s losses was 0.661, and that between the zip-based index and the 
losses was 0.996. Major derived that, in the conditional case, the statewide 
index rarely achieved more than 25% reduction in conditional volatility, 
whereas the zip-based hedge typically attained over a 70% reduction. In the 
unconditional case, when variation in the events is also taken into account, 
both hedges significantly reduced volatility, the numbers being 50-75% for 
the statewide index and 90-99% for the zip-based index. Thus, Major 
concluded, the statewide index is "afflicted by substantial basis risk caused 
by the variation in market penetration of insured portfolio".
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Harrington and Niehaus (1999) have also studied basis risk associated with 
index-based hedging. The authors compared two indices. The first one was 
an industry aggregate catastrophe loss ratio for the twenty states included 
in the CBOT’s Eastern PCS contract. The second index was an 
insurer-specific catastrophe loss ratio of a special form. Harrington and 
Niehaus employed linear regression analysis based on the historical data of 
the insurer’s catastrophe losses and the values of the loss index. The 
effectiveness of the hedge was measured by the coefficient of determination 
(R-squared) between the variable to be hedged and the underlying index of 
the derivative contract. Their regression analysis suggested that PCS 
derivatives would have provided a more effective hedge as compared to the 
one based on state-specific industry loss ratios.
However, even though the results based on historical data analysis do 
provide some insight into the benefits of hedging catastrophe losses and 
suggest better ways of doing it, such methods have certain disadvantages. 
For example, catastrophe loss distributions are highly skewed and have few 
observations from the tail of the catastrophe loss distribution during a given 
period. An alternative approach, which we present in the next Chapter, 
uses the theoretical risk-minimization framework to address the problem of 
finding an optimal design of a catastrophe index. We are going to compare 
the remaining risk resulting from hedging with each of five hypothetical 
indices for three models. The first one is a general model with the 
shot-noise intensity process for catastrophe losses, the second one involves 
some assumptions about the correlation among the companies’ losses and 
the third one considers shot-noise process with exponential marks for the 
losses.
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Chapter 2. Optimal design of catastrophe index
This chapter is devoted to finding the optimal design of a catastrophe index; 
the design that will minimize the basis risk for an insurance company. We 
consider an insurance industry comprising n companies in the same line of 
business and subject to more or less the same catastrophe risk. A tradeable 
index can be launched in the market, linked to the catastrophe-induced 
losses or some catastrophe parameters; such index can be used by an 
insurance company for hedging its own catastrophe risk. We introduce five 
hypothetical indices: two based on the total losses for the companies, two on 
the number of claims and one - the so-called severity index - based on the 
severity of the catastrophes within the specified time interval, and calculate 
the risk associated with hedging each of these indices and the corresponding 
risk-minimizing strategy. All indices are cumulative, adding data resulting 
from each catastrophe that occurred within the time period (0,7].
The research is conducted in the risk-minimization framework set forth in 
the mid-eighties by Follmer and Schweizer, and is the first attempt in 
applying this theory for choosing the optimal design of the catastrophe 
index. We start with the description of the risk-minimization theory in 
Subsection 2.1a and derive formulae for calculating basis risk in case of a 
tradeable catastrophe-linked index in Subsection 2.1b.
Then we proceed to more detailed models for the intensity of the claims 
arrival process in Section 2 .2 , and further specify the correlation among the 
losses suffered by the companies in the index. Subsection 2.2a contains 
formulae for the general shot-noise model for the intensity of the claims 
arrival process; Subsection 2.2b treats the case when these intensities are 
proportional to the company’s size and the catastrophe exposure which 
varies with catastrophes. A more thorough comparison of the risk-reducing 
properties of the indices becomes possible after an additional assumption of
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proportionality of catastrophe exposure of each company to the absolute 
catastrophe severity. This case is worked out in Subsection 2.2c, and we 
have found that, in such case, the best index is the one based on the total 
losses in the whole insurance industry, next best being the index based on 
the total number of claims for all n companies, followed by the severity 
index, which is equal to the sum of catastrophes’ severities occurred during 
time (0,7]. The two indices which exclude the hedging company should be 
placed in reverse order: the index based on the number of claims has a 
smaller unhedgeable risk part as compared to the index based on the total 
loss amounts. The last model treated involves the popular shot-noise 
intensities with exponential mark functions (Subsection 2.2d).
Subsection 2.2e has a more theoretical character. By using the martingale 
representation theorems for the point-process martingales, we consider 
indices based on the number of claims and then based on the total losses 
and establish the general form of the remaining risk for such indices using 
the coefficients of their martingale representations. In Subsection 2 .2f we 
illustrate how the formulae from 2 .1b can be applied for the commonly used 
Neyman-Scott model for the earthquake occurrence.
2.1 Risk-minimization theory
The concept of risk-minimization was introduced in 1986 by Follmer and 
Sondermann who proposed to measure the risk associated with a hedging 
strategy by a quadratic risk criterion. They have solved the problem of 
finding the risk-minimizing strategy for the case where the asset price 
process was a martingale. The general semimartingale problem was 
worked out soon after by Schweizer (1988). If the market is incomplete, the 
risk-minimizing strategy in the martingale case is found by projection on 
the space of the square-integrable martingales given by 
Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe decomposition (see Kunita, Watanabe (1967)). 
The analogue of this decomposition in the semimartingale case is called
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Follmer-Schweizer decomposition.
These methods are extensively used in the markets with restricted or 
incomplete information, theoretical foundation being provided in Schweizer 
(1994) and Follmer, Schweizer (1990); application to insurance payment 
streams is presented in Moller (2000,2001).
Our research represents the first application of the risk-minimization 
theory for the purpose of finding a catastrophe index with best hedging 
opportunities for an insurance company with a catastrophe risk exposure.
2.1a Basic ideas
Here we are going to briefly introduce the reader to the basic concepts of 
financial hedging under the criterion of risk-minimization. For a full 
account of the theory, see Follmer, Sondermann (1986) or Follmer, 
Schweizer (1990); Schweizer (1999) is a good survey reading.
Let (Q,.F,F = (JF/)/e[0,r|,P) be the filtered probability space where T is a fixed 
finite time horizon given by the maturity of the catastrophe derivative. 
The filtration F satisfies the usual assumptions of completeness and 
right-continuity, T t  = T  and T§ is trivial. Let £ 2(Q,JF,,P) denote the space 
of square-integrable random variables on (Q,^7,^ ). To make C1 a Hilbert 
space we take as equivalent random variables those that are equal almost 
surely and define the inner product and the corresponding norm ||*||
for arbitrary elements 1 ,7  e C? by
||X,||2 = E [ t f l  
« X „ Y ,  » =  E [X ,Y ,\
Now we introduce the financial market. There are two assets available for 
trading in the market, a bond and a stock (or any other tradeable asset), 
and their prices are random processes defined on £ 2(Q,JF,F,P) and denoted 
as B = and S = (S,)q<kt, respectively. We assume that Bt is
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deterministic and St is real-valued with right-continuous paths with limits 
from the left. We introduce the discounted stock price Xt = St/Bt; the 
discounted value deposited on savings account is, obviously, Bt/Bt = 1.
In what follows, we will consider a problem of hedging a contingent claim 
H t, or H for simplicity, by means of dynamic B,S -  strategies. Our hedging 
strategy will be represented by a pair (p = , where and 77, denote
the number of stocks and bonds in the portfolio, respectively. The process %t 
is predictable, that is, if we view it as a function of (/,&>) e [0, 7] x Q, it is 
measurable with respect to the a -algebra V  generated by the adapted 
processes whose all paths are left-continuous. This means that is fixed 
just before time t, and given F,_, the amount is determined. The process 
Tft is adapted, or T, -  measurable. A strategy (p = (%hTlt)o<KT with the 
components satisfying the conditions above is called admissible.
We call a contingent claim 77, due as a lump sum at time 71, attainable  if it 
can be replicated by means of a dynamic self-financing strategy based on 
the existing assets B and S. Such claims are sometimes called redundant as 
their payoff can be constructed by some combination of the assets that are 
already present in the market, and in this sense such claims do not bring 
new opportunities to the market. The financial market is complete if every 
contingent claim is attainable by means of some B , S -  strategy (see also 
Harrison, Pliska (1981)). It means that the risk associated with hedging 
can be eliminated completely by choosing a suitable dynamic strategy.
Now, consider a contingent claim at time T given by a random variable 
H e £ 2(Q,^r, P). As before, our hedging strategy is based on the stock S and 
the savings account B. The discounted value process of the resulting 
portfolio is
F,fy>) = + 77,, (0 < f < 7 ) ,  (2.1)
and the cost accumulated up to time t is defined as
t
C,(<p) = V,(q>) 4vdX„, (0 « t « D- (2 .2)
0
For the integral in (2.2) to exist, the amount %u invested in stocks should
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satisfy certain integrability conditions, which we will give on page 25.
D e f i n i t i o n  2.1. A strategy is called self-financing if its cumulative cost 
process is constant over time, i.e., if
Ct((p) = Co(<p), P-A.5 . ,  0 < t < T.
Self-financing means that after the initial moment t = 0, there is no capital 
injection to or withdrawal from the portfolio.
D e f i n i t i o n  2 .2. The market is said to present an arbitrage opportunity  at 
time To if there exists a self-financing (arbitrage) strategy Y such that with 
zero initial capital
Y0 = 0
the capital at time T is non-negative,
Yt >  0 P -  a. s.
and is positive with positive probability, that is,
P (fr > 0) > 0.
If the set of arbitrage strategies is empty, the market is called 
arbitrage-free. In the B, S -market that we consider this condition is 
equivalent to the existence of an equivalent martingale measure P*, such 
that X/ is a square-integrable martingale under P*; i.e.,
W [ X 2t ] < oo 
and
X, = E *[XT\X,l 0 < t < T ,
where W [ X t\X,] denotes the conditional expectation under P* with respect to 
cr-algebra (for a precise definition, see Harrison, Kreps (1979)). Such a 
martingale measure is unique if and only if the market is complete. When 
the market is incomplete, there are infinitely many martingale measures, so 
one may impose further constraints on the martingale measure and select 
the one of his preference.
Even though we will be considering an incomplete arbitrage-free market in 
this part, it is not the aim of our research to go into the issue of the choice of 
a martingale measure. We just assume that the financial market is
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arbitrage-free and we have already chosen an equivalent martingale 
measure P* so that X  belongs to the space M 2 of square-integrable 
martingales under P*.
Later in this section, we will need the following
D e f i n i t i o n  2.3. Let M 2 be the subspace of £ 2(Q,X,F,P) consisting of the 
square-integrable martingales under P with respect to the filtration F, and 
Xt, Y, are two elements from M 2. Then the predictable quadratic  
covariation process (X, Y)t is the unique predictable process with (X, Y)0 = 0 
and right-continuous increasing paths such that X,Y, -  {X, Y)t is a 
martingale. One can show that
t
(XyY), =} ¥,[dXsdYs\Fs- l
0
which explains its name. The process (X)t = (X,X)t is called the predictable  
quadratic variation process. The processes Xt, Y, are orthogonal, written 
Xt±Y„ if (X,Y)t = 0.
Now we can specify the integrability conditions on %u. Following the 
notation as in Follmer, Sondermann (1986), we denote by Py the finite 
measure on (Q x [0, T\,V) described by 
Px[A] = E*[j^Lf(r,<w)d < X  >, (©)],
and use the notation <£2(P£) for the class of predictable processes which, 
viewed as V  -measurable (as defined on page 23) functions on O x [0,7], are 
square-integrable with respect to P£. We will only admit strategies such 
that is a predictable process from <£2(P£) and the processes 
r=(v, (<p)) 04k t  and C — (C]((p))o</<7’ are square-integrable, have 
right-continuous paths and satisfy the boundary constraint Vr((p) = H 
P* -  a. s.
Suppose that the claim H admits the Ito representation
T
H = H 0 + \ t f d X u P - a . s .  (0 « t < T). (2 .3 )
0
Then we can use the following replicating strategy:
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(2.4)
/
V,(<p) := Ho +} t f d X s, 0 < t < T . (2.5)
0
We can also define Vt((p) as a right-continuous version of the martingale
When the market is incomplete, a claim cannot, in general, be replicated by 
a suitable self-financing strategy based on S. The claims that cannot be 
replicated by means of a self-financed hedging (or the noil-redundant  
contingent claims) are said to carry associated intrinsic risk. In such case, 
one can relax the requirement of achieving the payoff exactly equal to H  at 
time T and find a strategy that is "close", in some suitable sense, to H. 
Another approach, and the one we are going to follow in this paper, is to 
stick to the final payoff H but somewhat relax the self-financing constraint. 
For this purpose, a broader concept of a mean-self-financing strategy  will be 
introduced.
D e f i n i t i o n  2.4. A strategy is called mean-self-financing if the 
corresponding cost process C(<p) = (C,(<p))o</<:r is a martingale.
It means that once we have determined the initial value Vo(<p) = Co(<p), the 
additional cost Ct((p) -  Co{(p) is a random variable with expectation 
W[C,((p) -  Co((p)] = 0  (see Follmer, Schweizer (1988)), so that additional 
cost is zero "on average". One can see that any self-financing strategy is 
mean-self-financing.
We can aim to reduce actual risk associated with hedging non-redundant 
claims to its intrinsic component and construct an appropriate optimal 
mean-self-financing strategy. Here we have to define what we mean by 
"optimal". Using the notation from Follmer, Sondermann (1986), we 
measure the remaining risk associated with strategy (p by
(2 . 6)
(2.7)
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A risk-minimizing strategy is an admissible strategy q> which minimizes, at 
each given time t, the remaining risk Rt((p) over the space of all admissible 
strategies. A risk-minimizing strategy is necessarily mean-self-financing 
(for proof we refer the reader to Schweizer (1999)). Follmer and
Sondermann (1986) have proved that if an equivalent martingale measure 
P* exists, then for any claim a unique risk-minimizing strategy can be 
obtained by using the Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe projection of an element 
//from  £ 2(Q,^r,P*) on the space M 2 of square-integrable martingales. Then 
the Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe decomposition of the claim H is
T
H = Ho+j iudXu + Lj,  (2.8)
0
with Ho e C2(Q.,!Fo,F*), £ e<£2(P£), and the unhedgeable part
LH = (L?)o<kt e P*) is a zero-mean P* -  martingale which is
orthogonal to the space of stochastic integrals with respect to the process X,. 
The risk-minimizing strategy q> = ( |, 77) is then given by
|:= £ " ,  fj:=V(q>)-ZX,
with
i
¥,(</>) = H0 +1 t f d X u + L?. (2.9)
0
A claim H is  attainable if and only if the associated unhedgeable part Lj  can 
be eliminated completely. Since A is a martingale under P*, the value 
process Vt{q>) can be calculated directly as a right-continuous version of the 
martingale E^T/jAr], 0 < r < T , and the problem of finding the 
risk-minimizing strategy amounts to projecting this martingale on the 
martingale X  (see Follmer, Schweizer (1990)). Such projection means 
decomposing Vt((p) into a sum of two components: one belonging to the space 
of stochastic integrals with respect to the process X t and the other being 
orthogonal to that space as described in Definition 2.3.
In the following sections, this theory will be applied to the problem of 
hedging of the catastrophe risk by means of a strategy based on some 
tradeable catastrophe-linked index D, with D replacing stock S in the theory 
presented above. We focus on finding the best, in the sense of reducing
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intrinsic catastrophe-generated risk, index and the corresponding optimal 
strategy in the market where such index is traded. Even though an index 
can be constructed as a complicated function of losses or the number of 
claims, in this part of the thesis we restrict our study to the linear 
combination of losses, linear combinations of the number of claims and some 
indices of the knock-out type.
2.1b Application to calculating basis risk associated with hedging 
with a catastrophe index
First, we are going to state in brief the basic assumptions about our model 
and the key stochastic processes involved. At the beginning we introduce 
the catastrophe occurrence process K,. This process very much depends on 
the underlying natural phenomena and can be different even for the same 
peril but happening in various parts of the globe. The occurrence of 
earthquakes is well described by the Neyman-Scott clustering process (see 
Vere-Jones (1970)); for the rainfalls, the Bartlett-Lewis model has a better 
fit (see Rodriguez-Iturbe et al (1987)), and for the windstorms, Poisson 
process with constant parameter (suggested by Schmock (1999)) can be a 
good candidate. In Subsections 2.2a - e  we assume that Kt is a Poisson 
process with constant intensity ju, which can be easily replaced by a 
deterministic function jih and in Subsection 2.2f we consider a clustering 
process for the catastrophe occurrence. Throughout Chapter 2 , the process 
Kt is defined on the filtered probability space (Q,;F,F = ( f / ) te[0,7],P) with 
finite time horizon [0,7]. The filtration F = (T,)t&[o,T\ describes the amount 
of information that is available to the hedging company up to and including 
time t. We consider the natural filtration (T t)t&[o,r\, To is trivial.
The market consists of n insurance companies subject to the same 
catastrophic events. We assume that there is a risk-free bank account in 
the market, and are the random variables defined on the
probability space (Q ^ P ) and representing the accumulated catastrophe 
losses suffered by companies 1 ,2 ,...,«  at time T. Suppose that an index D,
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linked to the companies’ losses, is compiled by an independent agency. A 
derivative contract specifying the payment g(Dr) at maturity T, can be 
traded in the market. For simplicity, we will be considering only the trivial 
form of such contract, when g(Dr) = D t, and say that the index itself can be 
traded. The discounted price process of the index is a stochastic process 
adapted to F, denoted by Dt. As in the previous section, we assume that the 
market is arbitrage-free, so that we can choose an equivalent martingale 
measure P* such that the process Dt is a martingale under P* of the form
D, = W [ D T\Tt\  (2.10)
A specified company, say, number 1, wants to protect itself to some extent 
against losses associated with potential catastrophes by using a hedging 
strategy involving the index D. Construction of the optimal hedging 
strategy for company 1 involves the intrinsic value process 
The intrinsic value of a business is the value that is
determined by the cash inflows and outflows -  discounted at an appropriate 
interest rate -  that can be expected to occur during the remaining life of the 
business.
We aim to find the Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe decomposition as in (2.9)
t
= Vti ) + \^ dD „  + L^\  (2 . 11)
0
where L,(,) is a zero-mean martingale orthogonal to the space of stochastic
t
integrals of the type J t;sdDs. In other words, we have to solve with respect
o
to the equation
t
V^ u = V1^ +1 ^sdDs + Lj'\  or dV<?) = $,dD, + dL<i') (2.12)
0
under the condition dL^±.dDt. Since the difference
0 " ^  +J SsdDs = Z,(1) 
o
is the cost process corresponding to the hedging strategy based on D t (see 
(2.1), (2.2)), the remaining risk (2.7) can be calculated as 
R, := E * [(I<rl) - i j 0 ) 2!^,].
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After multiplying both sides of (2.12) by dDt and finding expectation 
conditional on we arrive at
W i d ^ d D ^ T t - ]  = W ^ t t d D t f ^ t ^  + WidL^dD^Tt-} =
= £tW[dDt dDt\Tt-] = %td < D >t ,
as ^  is predictable and dL^  is orthogonal to dDt. The optimal amount of the 
index to be held in portfolio is
Si =
E'jdVy'xdD']?,-] =  d<yV\D>,  
E*[dDi*dDi\Jr,-] d<D>i ( 2 . 1 3 )
The incremental unhedgeable part dL^  of the Galtchouk-Kunita-Watanabe 
decomposition (2. 11) is
dL{P  = dVj]) -  StdDt = dVj1} -  d<^ >' dDt. ( 2 . 1 4 )
Finally, we calculate the remaining risk R, using the fact that d -  %tdD, is 
orthogonal to dD, :
R, = E’
=  E"
= E"
j d <  L™ >s | T,
J E - f ^ 1’ -  d<v^ -  dD.)’ | jfA  | T,
l_ t
I K " "  > ■ I *
L_ t
T
J d < >s | T, - E ” I d<D>s T t (2.15)
We conclude that Rt depends on the index D only through the last 
component of the sum (2.15), which is minus
E’ (d<V^\D>s )■ d<D>s T t (2.16)
In the sections below, we will call (2.16) the "index-specific risk part". Also, 
we will assume that the measure we are working with is a martingale
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measure so that Dt is a martingale under it, and omit star sym bol" *" when 
taking conditional and unconditional expectations.
In Section 2.2, we are going to consider several variations of the shot-noise 
intensity model for catastrophe losses. Within each model, we calculate the 
remaining risk for several hypothetical indices and find out which index or 
indices have best risk-reducing properties.
2.2 Application to shot - noise intensity model for the 
catastrophe losses
In non-catastrophic insurance modelling, a Poisson process with 
deterministic intensity is usually adopted to describe the claims’ arrival 
process. However, due to the unpredictable nature of catastrophic events, 
such a process would no longer adequately describe the arrival of 
catastrophe-related claims. A Poisson process with stochastic intensity is a 
good alternative. In this Chapter, we will consider the so-called shot-noise 
intensity model, in which the intensity of the Poisson process has jumps at 
random times and continuously and monotonously decreases at exponential 
rate between jumps. The intensity in this model mimics the behaviour of 
the number of claims associated with catastrophic events: a sudden increase 
directly after a catastrophe is followed by a gradual decline. Of course, this 
model is not perfect. Firstly, one can always argue that the jump does not 
actually happen immediately after the catastrophe because some time is 
needed for the insured to estimate the risk they have suffered. Secondly, 
there is a specified period (usually 9 months) within which the claims 
related to the particular catastrophe can be accepted, and the exponential 
decrease does not provide for such a stop.
But, despite all these drawbacks, the shot-noise model still provides a fairly 
good description of the process, it is relatively easy to study and 
understand, has good analytical properties, and it allows for further
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modifications and improvements. In our thesis, we consider a general 
shot-noise process in Subsection 2.2a, with some variations in Subsections 
2.2b and 2.2c, and in Subsection 2 .2d we examine the shot-noise process 
with exponential mark functions.
In Subsection 2.2e, we apply the martingale representation theorem for 
point processes to express the remaining risk via coefficients of the 
martingale representation of the index’ price process. As an example of the 
application of the formulae from Subsection 2 .2a to an existing earthquake 
model, the Neyman-Scott cluster model, is considered in Section 2.2f.
2.2a General shot-noise intensity process
Let (Q,F,.P) be a probability space with the information structure given by 
F = {FtJ  e [0,7]} which includes all information available about the market 
up to and including time t. As we are going to study losses resulting from 
catastrophic events, we will begin with the catastrophe arrival process Kt.
i) Catastrophe arrival process. Let us denote by K, the number of 
catastrophes in the interval [0,/]. We assume that (K,)^o is a Poisson 
process with intensity jj.. Even though in this research the intensity of 
catastrophe arrival process is assumed to be constant, the transition to a 
more sophisticated and more realistic (possibly random) function will not 
pose significant difficulties as long as we assume that both Kt and fi, are 
independent of the loss processes the number of claims
and their intensities . . . , We suppose that
catastrophes arrive at random times Sk, k =  1, 2 , . . . ,  and are characterized by 
marks y* reflecting the absolute severity of the disaster. Insurers may 
obtain the values y* from meteorologists or seismologists. We suppose that 
for every k = 1,2,..., the marks y* do not depend on (K,)t>o and are 
independent and identically distributed random variables with distribution 
function G(y). We denote the first two moments of this distribution by m\ 
and m2 , correspondingly.
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ii) Claims arrival processes N a n d ,  their intensities A,w. Losses associated 
with the catastrophes will result in claims being submitted to the insurance 
companies. In what follows, we describe the number of claims submitted to 
the company number i by a doubly stochastic Poisson process 7VrJ,) driven by 
the stochastic process A^ which acts as its intensity.
As a more formal definition of the doubly stochastic Poisson process we offer 
the one adopted by Cox, Isham (1981):
D e f i n i t i o n  2 . 5 .  The process Nt is called a doubly stochastic Poisson process 
if there exists a real-valued non-negative stochastic process A,, such that if 
Ff denotes a whole realization of A, then the intensity of the process Nt 
conditional on Ff is A(/), where A(/) is the realized value of A,.
Such a definition means that, given the history of the process A,(,), the
increments for t\ < t2 are Poisson-distributed with parameter
/ 2
J ASds, and
2 \  /  '2
exp - J a ^ s I J a.v^
Pr{N,2 - N tx = *|A4,/, < s < t 2} = - ^ ' l (2.17)
The stochastic intensity here is assumed to be an observable shot-noise 
process as introduced by Cox, Isham (1981):
A”  = E  ( 2 . 1 8 )
0
where the functions M ^\t -Sk)  are the marks attributed to catastrophe 
number k and specific for each company. It will be natural to suggest that 
they are proportional to the company’s size, denoted as c,, and are linked to 
the magnitude y* of the catastrophe number k. In addition, we assume that
the catastrophe arrival times s* do not depend on y*. In this section, we do
not specify the mark functions.
iii) Claim size. The losses suffered by the company i up to and including
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time t are denoted by Jpp and equal
A*' (0
7=1
(2.19)
where Zyw is the size of the claim number j  submitted to the company 
number /. We assume that all claims are independent and have the same 
distribution function H(z). In what follows below, we assume that the 
intensity of the total losses increase is of the form
l f ( d z )  = l f H {d z ),
where A,(/) is a nonnegative T t -predictable process and H(dz) is the 
probability distribution of the claim sizes. We suggest that Xpp = 0 for 
i = 1,2, . . . ,  n. The expression (2.19) can be written in the integral form as
/  0C>
Af}0 = j J zdNi'\dz) (2.20)
5=0z=0
So the filtration we will be working with is the stream of a-algebras 
generated by the processes AP ,K S, Mp\  kPP and X^ P; T t=o{)PP ,KS, Mpp, N s \  
Xi'\ i = 1,2,...,>7, 0 < 5 < t, k < Ks}. One can say that T t contains full 
information about all the involved processes in real time. The filtration To 
is trivial.
We denote by the intrinsic value process for the company i . It equals
" n (7'> v,(,) N (p  .
E E  zp}\T, - E E  TfXFt + E E  4° 1
_7=0 -7 = 0 _j=N,+ \ _
Fj0 = E[xtp\T,]  = 
= Xp] + E[Z]E[Nf  -  n P  | T, ] =  Jpp + E[Z] J E(AS° I T,)ds. (2.21)
The second component of the sum in the last expression in (2.21) is 
computed below:
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\  B(a50 I F,)ds = J e (  L  M °(s - Sk) I ]<fc =
s=t s=t ^  ^=0 '
= |  e |  X  A $ \ s - S k ) +  X) M % \ s - s k) | ^  =
$=; V /c=0 k=K /+ 1 y
= 2 1  l=l M °  (■s  -  * * ) < &  +  E  (  2  M °  f a  - ■ * * )  j  ds. (2 . 22)
A=0
So we can rewrite (2.21) as
f}° = t fp  + e[z] ( f ;  M 0^  -  -s*)*+ C , E ( E  M°(-s -  sA ) *
\ k =0 S 1 5 ' \ k = K ,+1 7
(2.23)
The sum 2  f m1;)(s -  S k ) d s  above is a random variable observable at time t,
•> s=/
k=0
while \ T E| ^ k \ s ~ sk) W  is a deterministic function which we denote
byf \ t )  :
.k=K,+ \
K s
/ ° ( 0  = J^E l 2  M i \ s - S k )  \ds.
.» k—K /+1
The dynamics of is given below:
d V ^0  =  d ) 6p  +  E [ Z ] d (  X  j ^ M ^ f a  -  s* )< k  +  / ° ( 0  J =
. k=0
dx\° + E[Z]d( i ;  j^ A ^ fa  -  sk)ds j + E[Z]fW'(t)dt. (2.24)
.k =0
The differential of the expression in the round brackets can be split into two 
parts, the first one representing a new mark function resulting from a 
possible catastrophe at time t, and the second one standing for the changes 
in the mark functions related to the catastrophes which have occurred 
before time t:
4 E  ) = ( l ^ M f X s - S K ^ d K , -  E  M'-pit-s^dt.  (2.25)
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Since sk, equals t if dKt = 1 (that is, a catastrophe does occur at time t), we 
can now write (2.24) as
d v f  = + E[Z] I I Mf,(s -  t)ds \dK, + E[Z] I /« '(0  -  £  M^\t  -  sk) \dt =
\ s = t  J  >> 0<Sk<t J
T -t
= } zdNl;')(dz) + E[Z][ |  Mf,(s)ds W ,  + E[Z](/ ' > ' « -  E  M 'V -s* ) )<*•
y V ocsa<? yz = 0 .5=0
(2.26)
We keep in mind that, as, due to our assumption, catastrophes and claims 
do not arrive at the same time, at least one of the increments djdl\ dKt 
should equal zero. Also, the terms with {dt)2 are cancelled out as they are 
infinitesimals of order 2. Then the quadratic variance of equals
d{V)P = 
=E <ttf}+E[Z]( J M^,{s)ds ]^,+E[Z] 2  M 0( '-s* )  )<* ) \F>-
\ s = 0  J  k  0<5*</ J J
= E
T -t
= E
■ J r f A T / JcDpp* + E[Z] I J Mf,(s)ds
V5=0
A 2 1} zdNp(dz) \F , -  +(E[Z])2E
= | E[Z2]l!° + (E[Z])2E ( |  M$Xs)ds
T ,-
T -t 2 “1
.5=0
j M^]{s)ds
.5=0
\dt.
fidt -
(2.27)
Now we are going to introduce the indices. We specify two groups: indices 
based on the number of claims filed to the companies, and those based on 
the total losses incurred. Within each group, one index represents a linear 
combination of the basic elements (companies’ losses or the number of 
claims) with constant coefficients {a\ ,a2 , . . . , a n) or (b\ ,b 2 , . . . , b„) (see Table 1 
below); to define each combination uniquely, we set the first non-zero 
coefficient in the combination above equal 1 (that is, a\ = b\ = 1). After 
presenting the solution in the general case we look at some special cases. 
Next we consider indices which exclude information about losses for the
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first company, that is, when a\ = b i = 0. Such indices may be useful if the 
hedging company is just planning to enter the market or for some reason 
(small size, for example) cannot be included in the index. Then we consider 
the so-called "severity" index which depends only on catastrophes’ severity. 
These five indices are described in Table 1 below.
T a b l e  1.  C a t a s t r o p h e  i n d i c e s  - d e s c r i p t i o n .
index formula description
1 £
i= 1
weighted sum of losses for all n companies.
2 £ a t f ?
i=2
weighted sum of losses for companies 2,...,n.
3 £  b ,Nf  
/= 1
weighted sum of claims for all n companies.
4 £ b
/ 2
weighted sum of claims for companies 2,...,n.
5 X  yk
k<K,
sum of catastrophes’ severity up to and including T
We admit that the list above is far from exhaustive. For example, it does 
not include the indices of the knock-out type, like the Winterthur index. 
This is because in this case it is hard to derive a closed formula for the basis 
risk in the case of stochastic intensity for the claims arrival process. 
However, in Subsection 2.2e we will obtain formulae for the remaining risk 
via the coefficients of the index’ martingale representation. For a special 
case of a knock-out index with deterministic intensity for the claims arrival 
process, we will provide a more explicit formula involving only the intensity
process and the average size of the claim.
We suppose that all the indices listed above are traded in the market and 
their no-arbitrage discounted price processes are given by Dt = EfDrl^7/]. 
We shall label these processes by Dt with a superscript indicating the index 
number. In the rest of this subsection, we are going to calculate the 
remaining risk associated with optimal hedging of each of the five indices 
from Table 1. The results will be obtained in the form of the index-specific
risk part (2. ] 6) and collected in Table 2 .
37
The price process for the first index is
= E E  I F
T
=E dirt0 + E[Z] E |  I ^ ,1 * .
( =  1 s=t
Using (2.27), we can write
^  n n f  T - t  \  \
E  aidXt'P + E[Z] E  a. |  Mfx*)ds \dK,
2 -i
V/=i
= I E[z2] E  aM!° + (E[Z])2E
V j =0
« T-t
J ajM ]^(s)ds
i= ' 5=0
/Z J/. (2.28)
The predictable quadratic covariation process associated with Z),(1) and 
equals
d ( lA ' \D ^ ) t =
= E ^ a !*}0 + E[Z]^ j
f  T-
E  a i d t f 0 + E[Z] E  a, |  A$(.s)<*
i=\  V. 5=0  J  JV '  I I T '- \/= ]
E[Z2]/1!I) + (EZ)2e (  I ^ ( s ) d s  ( e  V -  (2.29)
.5=0 J \/= 1
Now the value (2.16) is
E [ Z 2 ]A ,( I ) + ( E Z ) 2 e Q ^  a 4 ' ) ( 5 ) ^ J  « , A ^ ( 5 M s ^  d t2
E [ Z 2 ] £ * 2 A,(U ( E [ Z ] ) 2 E ^ l s=o aiM^ M)ds
E [ Z 2 ]A ,( , ) + ( E Z ) 2 E Q r  ^  M ^ l ^ d s  )  s C ,  ^  a i ^ t {s)ds
V  /= i
E[z2]2 «rA,(')+(E[Z])2E i ^ \ T ' a^ ) d s
/ i  \dl
■dt. (2.30)
If we consider a similar index but without the hedging company, that is,
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nD 2^) =53 Oi^fi resulting index-specific risk part will be
/=2
{d<v^^>, y
d<D™ >,
(EZ)2e Q ^  M^ (S)ds^ j
E[z2]^ a 2A,W+(Ez)2E (e C  ^aiMK](s)ds^  //.
■dt. (2 . 31)
The third index is the weighted sum of companies’ numbers of claims.
D ?  =E b,Nf.<0
Z)P} = E 
d(Dm ){ = E
E  N f  I 7-, =EM°+EJ euFijp,)*.
/=] /= 1 s=t
X  + dK t  t  c
/•=1
=E b)xfd t  + E
/=l
N 2
E  j dK, |
/■ »
E  *?^'’ + E
V/=i
/=1 
f "
E
V /= i
/i L/f.
( 2 . 3 2 )
( 2 . 3 3 )
The predictable quadratic covariation process associated with and Z)P} 
equals
d ( V ^ \ D ^ ) t =
= E [ (dX ,^1} + E[Z]} ($)<&/.£,)
[ E  M-M0 +E (s)ds )  dK,
/= ]
= E[Z]| A,(l) + E (i:; w *)  ^ e
^ - ]  = 
fi \dt, ( 2 . 3 4 )
and the index-specific risk part is
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d<DW>,
(E[Z])2^A,(I)+E { j 7j (1 ( u :  j O'
1=1
dt. ( 2 . 3 5 )
For the fourth index Z)(r4) =^  N j \  which excludes the hedging company from
i=2
the pool, we have
(d<i^j)w>, y ( E [ Z ] ) 2 ^ E O'
d < D (4)>, n
I ^ 2 a ,( , )+ e [ t l TJ 0
dt. ( 2 . 3 6 )
Another interesting candidate for an index is what we would call the 
severity index. Namely, it is the sum of catastrophes’ magnitudes up to and 
including T:
D (5) _ V  T -  2 - 1  y k -
K K r
Its price process is
£>,(S) = E
w
1
T, ii M y k + E
1
W
1
_ k ^ K  r _ k^K, _  K,<k^K,
= 2  yk + m]id(T-t),
k<K,
dD^p -  yK,dKt -  m\iidt. 
d(D{5))t = ElyX'dKtlFt-] = mifddt. 
d <  F(I\D (5> >t =
T- t  \
=E
=E
dLY^+EfZ] J Mx\s)ds  dKt \{yK,dKt -  m\^idt) \ T t- 
U o  J J  _
—  ~  ' T - t( T-t \
E[Z] J MiP(s)ds \dK,yKldK, \ T t 
U o  J
E[Z]E
( 2 . 3 7 )
( 2 . 3 8 )
( 2 . 3 9 )
— \i=o
m  i fid t.
Then the index-specific risk part equals
( r r v  ^ “ Y
E [ Z ] E h ^ ] { s )d s m\j.i
V _L=o ) _ J
d<D™ >, m ^ 1
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T - t
(E[Z]) 2 m f m2 E
V
J fidt. ( 2 . 4 0 )
1 -5= 0
The index-specific remaining risk parts for indices Z)(1) -  are collected in 
the Table 2 below.
T a b l e  2 .  I n d e x - s p e c i f i c  r e m a i n i n g  r i s k  p a r t s .
index formula remaining risk part
'5
X
/=2
X  ^
7 -1
i=2
Z  TA
k&Kr
E [ Z 2 ] A ,( i ) + ( E [ Z ] ) 2 E  J m ^ ( 5 V 5  (5 )^ /5
'= • ,v=0
n Y " r~* ^2 ~
e [ z 2 ] Z ° ' a '( , ) + ( E [ z ] ) 2 e Z  j a 'MK)l (S^ S / '
/= I _  V  '=  1 v=0 J
dt
( E Z ) 2 E  J < / ( 5 V 5  £ 1  a,M^](s)ds
'=2 v=0 7 J
E[Z2] f > ? A f('')+(EZ)2E| V  fo .A ^ W  I //
v^ io  J
■dt
( E [ Z ] ) 2
/
A,( l ) + E
I  ^J < W ^ Z j  ^K^ds  j ■J
7=1
Y "  r~' Y~
Z | 6 , w a ! w *
_  V  '=1 5 -0  J / '
dt
( E [ Z ] ) 2 ^ E ^  J  < ) ( 5 ) ^ 5  j  ^  J  < , ( 5 ) *  j 'J
2 ^ ;2 A,( , ) + E
/=2
dt
(E [Z])2^ - E
r-/
j
.5=0
fidt
Since the model is very general, it is difficult to compare all the indices 
without further assumptions about the intensity functions. Still, even at 
this stage we can compare indices 2 and 4 for the same weights a , = 6,,
/ = 1, . . . ,  n. If the numerator and the denominator of the ratio for the fourth 
index were multiplied by (E[Z])2, the difference between the two indices will 
be only in the denominators:
41
n f  n T~t A
E[Z2] X  a?*'0 + (EZ)2E X I  aiMf,(s)ds fi
i=2 V i=2 s=0 J
for the second index and
f  n T -t N 2
(E[Z])2 X  62A,m + (E[Z])2E
i=2
for the fourth one.
Z j  bM$Xs)ds 
V '=2 5=o
Since E%2 ^ (E£)2 for every and = 6,-, we conclude that the fourth index 
is better than the second one.
2.2b intensities proportional to exposure and size
In this Subsection, we are going to consider more specific functions 
M ^\t-S k )  by stipulating the form of dependence among the companies’ 
losses. We assume that they are proportional to the company size c,, and 
take the size of the company 1 as unity. Also, we have mentioned that the 
marks should be linked to the catastrophe magnitudes. We assume that, as 
a result of the catastrophe number k with absolute severity yk, the company 
number i is hit by an "impact factor" y^\  The "impact factors" y ^  are 
identically distributed random variables, with the same distribution 
function G{y) of the catastrophe magnitude, independent for different 
catastrophes but correlated for the same catastrophe. We assume that 
there is dependence among impact factors, which is the same for each 
catastrophe and varies only from one pair of companies to another. This 
dependence is expressed in relationships E ‘M,2) = for i\ * *2,
= m0J , and is stipulated by the proximity of the objects insured by 
each pair of companies. This essentially means that the companies, which 
insure closely situated objects, are likely to experience similar impact 
factors. As in Subsection 2 .2a, m \ and m2 stand for the first and second 
moments of G{y), correspondingly. Then the mark functions and the 
intensities will be of the form
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M^\t -  sk) = c,y^g(t -  sk), 
4 °  = Z  dy^g i t -Sk) ,
(2.41)
(2.42)
0 <sk<t
where g(t) is a deterministic component of the mark function common to all 
companies. Then we can write the integral from (2.27) as
T -t T-t
|  Mx](s)ds = ayf t  j g(s)ds,
5=0 5=0
M%](s)ds j g ( s - s Kl)ds,
(2.43)
(2.44)
'= '5 = 0 5=0
Therefore, the index-specific risk part (2.16) for the index is
{d<vv\D^>, y
d < D ^ > ,
^ E [ Z 2 ] A , 0 ) + ( E [ Z ] ) 2 . E
X L 'J
E [ Z 2 ] ^ A , t ' ) + ( E [ Z ] ) 2 - E
<=i
dt =
E [ Z 2 ] A , ° W ( E [ Z ] ) 2 e ( •( % s  \d
E [ Z 2 ] J ] a , ( , ) + ( e [ z ] ) 2 |  J  g { s ) d s  I e (
■dt =
E [ Z 2 ] A ,C I ) + ( E [ Z ] ) 2  J g ( 5 V 5
=0 J '^=1 '■='
clm2+y~'c\clmt)i // 
/=2
7-r
E [ Z 2] J ] a ,w + ( E [ Z ] ) 2 J g ( 5 ) *  I -
7=1 /=1
■dt, (2.45)
T-t
To make the formulae look simpler, we denote J g{s)ds as g t and
5=0
T -t
J g(s)ds as gj, so that we can write
.5=0 J
d < D ^ > ,
^ E Z 2 A ,( l ) + ( E Z ) 2 - g 2
n
c \ m 2 + ^ ~ ' c \ c lm \ i
_ ' /= 2 O’
n
E Z 2 y ^ A , ( / ) + ( E Z ) 2
/= !
• g , (  y ± c j c i m ,  
V 7 = 1  / = i )"■
dt, (2.46)
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and for the second index
{ d < V ^ \D ^ > , y
d<D™>,
f n A2
(E Z )2* 2
V _ /=2 j
E[Z2] j^ A ,(,)+(EZ)2.g,2| S ' S ' cjCjin,: ]/<
7=2 /=2
J/. (2.47)
For Z),(3) we have
d<Dm >,
(E [Z])2 A,(1)+g2 C | W 2  +
X A'(,)+^ 2( 2 S C/C'W/.' r
7=1 i=i
■dt, (2.48)
and for £>}(4)
{ d < V ^ \D ^ > , y
(E [Z])2^ 2
ft
S C|C/ml7
_ /=2
d<DW>, " A
/=2
^ X C' C,/W7
V /= 2 /=2
dt. (2.49)
The expression for Z)(5) is as follows:
(d < V ^ \D ^ > , y
d<D™>, = (E[Z])
2 W| 
mj E
r-/
j A/^(s)ds
— s= 0
= c?(E[Z])2-^g?p^ =
(2.50)
These are the general formulae that can be used by insurance companies 
which have available the necessary estimators for c,-, mu and mor In the 
following section, we are going to make further assumptions about the 
correlation coefficients p, , which will enable us to carry out a more 
detailed comparison of the indices Z)(1) -
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2.2c Proportional exposure
The correlation between y j l\  y;-'2) in terms of . and m l, m2 is
mi i ~m2\p, , = —Li—r-. Depending on the value of the correlation coefficient,K/i-'2 m2-m\  ^ ®
various modifications of the formulae (2.52-2.56)  can be obtained. Here,
we shall consider the case when pf. . s  1 for all /1, /2 = 1, n. It means that
the impact factors are linearly dependent. However, taking into account the 
nature of the processes we study, it is more suitable to suggest that we 
simply have a proportional relationship among impact factors yj l]\  These 
proportionality coefficients may be dictated by the geographic location of the 
companies and their proximity to the potential sources of catastrophes. For 
example, if the companies insure against flood, those who have more 
policyholders along seashore or a riverbank are likely to be at a greater risk.
So let us assume that p,. . = 1 and = a,,yj. This assumption implies 
that m = Ey)")y)'2) = af|a,2W2 for /1,/2 = 1  w, and the intensities
A,(0 = 2  ciOLiykg { t - s k) = c/a/A, (2.51)
0 <s*</
differ only in the coefficient Here X, denotes Y  ykg(t ~ sk).
0
For the first index we have:
E[Z2]ciaiA,+(E[Z])2g?C|aim2(rf<KO).DO)>,)2 _  ^ i f r  =
E[Z2]^ yV,g,^ A,+(E[Z])2g2w2^ ^ c^,a,  ^ //
E[Z2]A,+(E[Z])2| 2ff?2[ T t * ,  Ui
a ] ------------- ;-----^ ----1— dt. (2.52)
2 c'a'
Then for the second one:
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,  (E[Z])4 Y tciai \ ( g j c {a^m 2j . i )2(j<vo\ dw>, y  = Vtr J dt
d<D™>, (  * \
E[Z2]X,+(E[Z\)2gjm2l Y,c'a' /'•
For the third index we obtain:
(E [Z ])2 ( a \ h t + g } a \ m 2 (  Y , c ia < I / 1 I (E [Z ])2 f X,+g}m 2i . i Y c 'a ' jy  _ I  I t r  J  J  ,dt =  a2 v t r  J
d < D ^ > ,
u i  -  w ,
3 v 1 - 1 ( 'sr  ^ Y  c'a‘X / >  C y g ,+ g r /W 2 >  C/gf- / /  Z-I
/=i v 1=1 y '_l
The formula for the fourth index is
(E[z])2(g2/M2/0 2>, ; 2 
— -—  =  n ,
d < D w >,
} .  a?----------------
aiA,+g2w2^  yica, 
V /=2
And for the fifth one it will be 
We summarize the results in the Table 3:
( 2 . 5 3 )
dt. (2.54)
( 2 . 5 5 )
(2.56)
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T a b l e  3 .  I n d e x - s p e c i f i c  r e m a i n i n g  r i s k  p a r t s  f o r  p r o p o r t i o n a l  
e x p o s u r e .
index formula remaining risk part
i=\
n E[Z2]A,+(E[Z])2g > 2l E c' a ' L
«1------------- 5-----— ----— dt
^c,a,
„ (E[Z])4 I Y ' o a ,  J(g?cia |O T 2; 0 2
E x f  ----------- 1=2 ( . ^ *
i=2 E[Z2]A,+(E[Z])2g?m 2 | y jC/fl/ L .
A.i+g}m2nY,ciai
E ^ f  a?(B[Z])2A----- a - * ----L dt
i- 1 E Cil“
/= ]
„ ( ^ o 2f l > < )
E ^ r  «?(E[2 ])2---------- j * - ^ d t
i=1 a\X,+g}m2A  Y c , a ,
2  a?(E[Z]) -j^gj/ndt
teKr
We already know from Subsection 2.2a that the fourth index is better than 
the second one. Now we can add that, for the same reason, since 
®[£2]  ^ (®[£])2 f°r every the third index is worse than the first one. By 
looking at the difference between the third and the fourth ratio, we can see 
that it is strictly positive:
Thus, we may now conclude that the third index is better than the fourth 
one. The severity index can be placed between the third and the fourth. 
For the proof, we estimate the difference between the third ratio and the 
fifth one ((2.54) minus (2.56)):
(E[Z])2 j X,+gJm2n y ^ C i  I dt
2 >
= (E [Z]y
-(E [z ])2-£hr?M
f
V
f
+g?m2/i
V I
V
J J
> (E[Z])2jngj(m2 -  -Sr)dt > (E[Z]Yfigjm2mjm2 dt > 0. (2.58)
It means that the fifth index is ranked lower than the third one. The 
following computation shows that, in our hierarchy, the fifth index goes 
straight after the third index and before the fourth one. We divide the 
expressions (2.55) for the fourth index and (2.56) for the fifth index by the 
common factor (E[Z])2fidt and by doing so we only have to compare
)(g?w2)2^
(2.59)
A,+g,2m2// y \ j
and
m\ *2 -Yrsf- (2.60)
We will look at their reciprocal values:
and for the expression from fourth index
mi < mi 
-2 4 ^  -2 2g f m  | g f m j
the left-hand side of (2.62) being the inverse of (2.60), which corresponds to 
the fifth index and right-hand side being the reciprocal of (2.59) which is 
related to the fourth index. So we conclude that the reciprocal of the 
expression for the fifth index is smaller than that for the fourth one, and 
thus the fifth index is better than the fourth one.
We can now order indices from the best to the worst: Z)(1) - Z)(3) - D(5) - Z)(4) - 
D(2). The first order Z)(1) - D(3) is no surprise, as with the transfer from the 
total loss amount to the total number of claims essential information about 
the claim size is lost. The superiority of index Z)(4) over index D(2) is less 
obvious. It can be explained if the information about other companies 
excluding the hedging company is viewed by it as some noise. In this sense, 
the less noise the better, and the index based on the number of claims for 
companies 2 reduces remaining risk better than the index which 
settles on the total accumulated losses suffered by the same companies. 
The severity index is essentially on the borderline: it still contains some 
information related to company 1, but in a minimal amount, and it still 
exceeds both indices which do not depend on the data for company 1. We 
may expect other possible indices to be ranked higher above index Z)(5) if 
they involve data on the hedging company and have more information, and 
lower than index Z)(5) if they have more information but do not include 
company 1. Theoretical grounds for this phenomenon based on the 
martingale representation theorem for point processes are given in 
Subsection 2.2e.
2.2d Shot - noise with exponential mark functions
In this section we are going to derive the formulae for remaining risk and
Al
g f m i
+ (2.62)
7>, }(g?mi)2v
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the hedging strategy for the case of the exponential mark functions. These 
functions are a good representation of the nature of the claim arrival 
process. As a catastrophe occurs, there is a sudden jump in the number of 
submitted claims and then the process declines at the rate of decay cr. 
These processes have been studied by Dassios, Jang (2003) for the purpose 
of obtaining the gross premium for stop-loss reinsurance contract and 
arbitrage-free prices for insurance derivatives. A detailed account of the 
theory of the point processes with exponential marks can be found in 
Bremaud (1981) and Daley and Vere-Jones (2002). On the graph below, the 
trajectory of the intensity of a shot-noise process with exponential mark 
functions is demonstrated.
G r a p h  4 .  T r a j e c t o r y  o f  i n t e n s i t y  o f  a  s h o t - n o i s e  p r o c e s s  w i t h
E X P O N E N T I A L  M A R K S .
Tim e
We are going to find the optimal strategy (2.13) and the remaining risk 
(2.15) for the three best indices, namely D^]\  D and D(5) by using the 
formulae (2.26), (2.52), (2.54) and (2.56). As before, the terms with (dt)2, 
which are infinitesimal of order 2 , are neglected.
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First we will write explicitly what are the values g t and the random 
processes X,, X^ in the case of exponential (decaying at the rate cr) mark 
functions:
T - t T- t
g t = |  e asds = J e asds =
5=0 5=0
= E  yte~^-Sk\
—  = at
0<Sk<t
X, = X  CiUiyke a{t 5a). 
0
(2 .63 )
(2 .64 )
Then the strategy and the remaining risk for the first index are
e ( l )  _  d < V ^ \ D ^ > ,  _   a j
* 1 d < D ^ > ,
R {, ]) =  E
= E
]Cc/a'
f=l
T
\ d < ^ > s I F,)
L_ t
T
- E (d<v('KD^ >s yd<D>.s I Ft
J | aC?<„l) + E[Z]| } \ f ,
- E
T E[Z2]A„+(EZ)2(i^~q/" l) ) m2\ Y/iai
J a \ ------------------ ;----------—  — du | T t
X C/a/
= a,E[Z2] j E[Xu\Tt]du + a 2^ E[Z\)2m2!d j (J=s±!i±) 2du
( 2 . 6 5 )
-  —E[Z2] j E[Xu\Tt}du-a](^ [Z \)2m2H j ( | _ e —<r(7—w) \  2) du =
= a.
A
ai
v
E[Z2] j E[>w|JF]dw. (2 . 66)
We only have to find J E[ku\Tt]du. The subintegral expression equals
E[\U\T,] =  E X  y ke-a{u~Sk) T t = + E T .  yke ^
_ 0<5*<W _ _  t<Slt<U _
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The first component in the sum above shows the contribution to intensity 
due to the catastrophes occurred no later that time t, while the second one 
shows the input of catastrophes which happened after time t. This second 
part is computed below:
E • £  y k e - o ( .u - s t ) 
. KSk^ U
1=J Ey/ie S^ ds = e au J m\fieasds =
Now we can write that for t < u < T
This, in particular, shows that 
E[AU] =
Now we go back to (2.66) and use the notation from (2.63):
T T
J E[X,m|JF/]Jw =J (e a(M l)Xt + m\fi l-e J("- ) du = 1 e^ —'-Xt + m\fi-
1 - CT_|_e-a(7-0A n — * \ —Clit + m\n- L -2---  = atAt + m\fi—
so the remaining risk is
r  ^
n ( ' ) _  r . K, -  a i 1 - E[Z2] J =
=  a  i
A
i -
V
E[Z2](a,A, +
If the distribution of the catastrophe severity is exponential with parameter 
7, then the remaining risk is
R,(l) = CL |
A
1 - E[Z2] ( a tXt + y ^ ) . (2.67)
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Now we calculate the optimal strategy and the remaining risk for the third 
index:
e ( 3 )  ___ d<V^\D^>, _
^  ~ d<DW>,
(EZ)2^ a  iX,+g2a im2
" T~n VX^\iai+g2m2\ y \jCCi n dt -
(E Z ) 2a\
n  9
2 c,a'
/= i
(2 . 68)
fl,(3) = a,E[Z2] j ^ [ \ u \ F t ] d u  +  a ] ( E Z ) 2 m 2 ^ i  j  ( h -e ^ — ) 2 d u -
- E
T (E Z )2 A„+g,2m2/< y^c;« /
j a ]   — ----- - ---- —du | T t
t Y j ' a<
=  a,E[Z2] } E[X„| ,^](/w + a?(EZ)2m2M j  (  l~e^ (,"> ) 2d u -
=  <*i
(E/ )2a' j E Aw +
S c'a' /
/ =  I
-
A
aiEIZ2] (E„Z)2“'
/ = i  z
r A
E[Z2] (! [z])!
V  / = |
c,a.
i_^(r-o \  2
i=\
du =
j  E [A M|.F /] d «  =
(2.69)
The optimal strategy and the remaining risk for the severity index D(5) are
=
E[Z]E | |  ^K,is)ds j mifi
_ V s=Q J _
m 2/i = E[Z]E
/  r-/ y
I j  ^K,(s)ds 
_  V j=0 J  J
(2.70)
I I
= «iE[Z2] J E^wl^7/ ] ^  + a2(EZ)2m2^  j ( l - e  g (? w) ) 2du -
' Tj (MA)1J^ AaW u I Tt- E
/  /
= a,E[Z2] J E[UF,]<*< + «?(E[Z])2(»i2-■£*•)#« J { ^ ^ - ) 2du =
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= a ^ [ Z 2](a,X, + + a \ ( W \ ? { r m  -  ^ ( - £ -  -  ^ [ >  + f  ] )  =
= a 1E[Z2]a,A, + a5(E[Z])2('«2 -  "  H i  + f  ] )  +«iB[Z2] m , ^
(2.71)
The formulae (2.65), (2.68) and (2.70) give the optimal hedging strategy in 
the market with indices D w , and Z)(5). Interestingly, the strategy for 
the first and the third index is constant over time, while for the fifth index 
it depends on t.
2.2e General representation of the basis risk for the point-process 
martingales
In this subsection, we will consider two types of indices in the most general 
form. The first type includes any index D' that ignores the sizes of the 
claims and the catastrophe severities and only counts them; that is, the 
index which is based on the claims arrival processes ... ,N ^  and the 
catastrophe arrival process K,. To obtain the formulae for the remaining 
risk for such index, we will need the following theorem (see Bremaud 
(1981)):
T h e o r e m  2 . 1 .  (Integral Representation of Point Process Martingales). Let 
(jV,(l),...,A r!'w)) be an m -  variate point process on (Q,.F,P), P -  non-explosive, 
and let Q, be its internal history. Suppose that for each / (1 < / < M), N  
admits the (P,£,)-predictable intensity Let now M, be a
right-continuous (P,Qt) -martingale of the form Mt = E[Mr\Qt], where Mr  is 
some P -integrable random variable. Then for each t > 0
m
M, = Mo+ E  I ' ^ i d N s i i )  -  Xs(i)ds) P - a . s . ,
i= 1
where for each i (1 < z < M), G,(/) is a Qt -predictable process satisfying
t
J | | < oo P - a . s . ,  t  ^0.
o
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We can also write it in the infinitesimal form, which we will mostly be 
using:
rri
dM, =Y,  g!° (aw*0 -  X fd t )  P - a . s . (2.72)
7=1
In our setting, a catastrophe index can involve several point processes: the 
claims arrival processes and the catastrophe arrival process Kt.
Since any of the claims arrival processes are linked to the process Kt, the 
catastrophe arrival process is the only one which must be present in the 
martingale representation of an index, that is, G,w * 0. Thus, the dynamics 
of the index will be of the form
dD', = G ?\dK ,  -  ndt) + £  G<in(dN<i0 -  X fd t ) , (2.73)
7=1
where some or all of the processes g!;), i = can be zero. Then the
minimal hedging error associated with trading such index is based on the 
predictable quadratic variance of the index price process
d(D')l = E G f \d K ,  -  ndt) + £  g!° -  X fd t )  I | T,.
=  ( G r o w s  (
7=1
and the predictable quadratic covariance process
d < VU\D' >, =
= e [ (  d ^ l)+E[Z] j ^ ( s ) d s d K ,
s= 0
( G f \d K ,  -  fidl) + £  G,(,) (d7Vj° -  X fd t )  ) | T7,-] =
7=1
T-t
= E[Z]G,(0)E J M^(s)ds Udt + G ^ W Q ^ d t .
.5=0
The increment of the remaining risk part (2.16) for the index D' equals
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(d < V V \D '> , y  
d<D'>,
g,(0)e|^  |  ]^{s)ds jn+G^y
K )) V 2 K ,)2a'w
(E[Z ] )2dt. ( 2 . 7 4 )
f  T-t \  2
The components G,(0)E J M^\s)ds  \p in the numerator and (gJ0)) p in the
V5=0 J
denominator of the expression above are present for any non-trivial index. 
One can observe that if the hedging company’s claims arrival process is 
excluded from the index, and therefore G,(1) = 0, then the value (2.74) can be 
maximized by minimizing the denominator to its catastrophe arrival 
component ( g ,(0)) 2/z by setting G,(,) = 0, z = 2,...,w. Then (2.74) reduces to 
its maximal possible value
{d < V ^ \D '> ,  ) : 
d<D’>,
T -t
E |  A $ \s ) d s
-5=0
We conclude that, if the hedging company is not in the index for some 
reasons, then the best hedge of its catastrophe risk will be provided by the 
index which depends only on the catastrophe’s arrival process K,. 
Introduction of the companies’ claims arrival processes to the index will 
have an adverse effect on the quality of the hedge; the smaller is the sum
(GS0) 2^ !0, the better.
/=i
The second group comprises indices D” which depend on the catastrophe 
arrival process Kt, catastrophe severities y*, claims arrival processes 
and claim sizes. In such case, we will be dealing with marked 
point processes, where y* and claim sizes Xjl) will act as marks. The formal 
definition of a marked point process is given below:
D e f i n i t i o n  2 . 6 .  Let there be defined on some measurable space ( Q ^ P ) :
i) a point process Tn (or Nt),
ii) a sequence (Z„,n > 1) of E -valued random variables, where (E,8) is a 
measurable space.
Then the double sequence (Tn,Zn, n >  1) is called an E -m a rk ed  point
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process. The measurable space (E,E) on which the sequence {Zn,n > 1) takes 
its values is the mark space.
The internal history of (T„,Zn,n > 1) is defined by
An extension of the Theorem 2.1 to marked point processes is needed for 
evaluating the remaining risk for the index D" (the complete account of the 
relevant theory can be found in Bremaud (1981)). But before we introduce 
it, we need to make further assumptions about the intensity functions of the 
claim arrival processes X^ and introduce the following
D e f i n i t i o n  2.7. Let p{dt x dz) be an E -  marked point process with (P,^7/) -  
intensity kernel Xt(dz) of the form
Xt{dz) = Xt<$>t(dz),
where Xt is a nonnegative .7)-predictable process and Ot(co,dz) is a 
probability transition kernel from (Q x ^ o o ) ,^ ® ^ )  into (E,£). The pair 
(A,,0t(dz)) is called the (P, T t) -local characteristics of p{dt x dz).
T h e o r e m  2 . 2 .  (Integral Representation of Point Process Martingales). Let 
p{dt x dz) be an E -  marked point process with the (P,^7,)-local 
characteristics (A,,0t(dz)), and the internal history T, has the special form 
Ti = T § \ l F 3l . Then any (P,^7/) -martingale Mt admits the stochastic 
integral representation
i
Mt = Mo +JJ G(s,z)q(ds x dz) P -  a.s., (2.75)
0  E
where
q(dt x dz) = p(dt x dz) -  Xt(dz)dt
and G(t,z) is an E -indexed T t -predictable process such that 
/
JJ \G(s,z)\Xs(dz)ds <oo P - a . s . ,  t > 0.
0  E
The infinitesimal form of (2.44) is
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dMt =J G(t,z)[p(dt x dz) -  Xt(dz)dt] P - a . s . ,
E
The discounted price process of the index D",
D" = e [ D't |
is a right-continuous martingale, and according to the Theorem 2.2 there 
exists the following infinitesimal representation:
dD" = Gm (t,z)yKl(dK, -  f.idt) + £ j  G<'>(f,z) ( d t f 0 -  Xf(dz)dt) ,  (2.76)
/ = ]  e
where y^, equals the severity of the catastrophe number Kt and G(0)(/,z) is 
non-zero. Other processes G(,)(/,z), however, can equal zero. Then we can 
calculate the remaining risk part by computing
^G(0)(t,z)yK, (dK, -  fidt) Gv\ l , z ) (d X (,l) -  xP(dz)dt)  1  I T,-
= ('G,(0)(/,z ))2/kA+E {G\i)( t , z ) )1'E[7}]Xfdt,
i-i
d  < VW,D" >, =
= e[^c7Y{i) + E[Z] J A4%{s)dsdK^
^G^{t,z)yKl{dK, -  fidt)
+u
G<'>(f,z)(<«j0 -  X{P(dz)dt)  j  | =
= G<i)(/,z)(E[Z])22.,<i,cA; 
and then finding the ratio 
(<f<('O.D">, Y _ (g"'!,-,)-''')2 (E[z])4
d<D">, .  2 „n  E [Z’i dt. (2.77)
The comparison of the risk associated with hedging based on the index of 
D1 -type and the one based on the index of D" -type requires identifying the 
processes G,(,) and G(,)(/,z), which is not trivial. However, we can evaluate
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the remaining risk for some indices of D' -type in the case when the 
intensities are deterministic. Let us consider an index D1" that indicates 
whether the weighted number of claims submitted to n insurance companies 
exceeds some specified amount B. This will be an index of the knock-out 
type similar to the Winterthur index (see Section 1.1). We may denote
n n
E  wv}° by Nt, its intensity J2 bjX® by A,, and write the price process for
i=0 /= 1
the index D'" as
D'," = e [ i <)V,<b> | J-,1 = P[A^ r < B|M] = P[NT- N ,  < B -N , \N , ]  =
B-N,  d T A sd s y  J T * ds
= 22 —LJ\---- e = h(t,Nt).
7=0
So D',” is a martingale which can be expressed as some function h of t and N,. 
Then we can write
dD'," = (KUN ,_ + 1) -  h{t,Nt-))(dNt -  A,dt) =
=  i e {^N,-<B}(dNt -  Atdt) = p(t)I{N,-<B}(dN, -  A,dt),
where p{t) is J7,- -  measurable.
d < D"' >, = E[(/7(02{a/,-cb>(^W -  A tdt))2 \ F t-~\ = p(t)2l {Nl^ B}Atdt.
d < V^ ]\D"' >t =E
T-t
^ ,}+E[Z] J Mi^ (s)dsdKt \p(t)I{Nl_<B}(dNt -  A,dt) \ T t-
s=0 J
( ~ m i  = (K».; r > E t z u n  dt = (E[z ^ » )  dt _  2dt
d<D >, p ( 0 2I {/v,_c«}A» V V , ( » )
/  f i jA'f
However, the cases with stochastic intensity are much more difficult, and 
we leave them for future research.
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2.2f Example: application to earthquake model
In the sections above, we assumed that the catastrophe occurrence process 
is a Poisson process with constant intensity. Of course, this assumption is 
somewhat idealised, and the real-life models of catastrophic events are more 
diverse. Empirical studies show that not only do the models for different 
natural disasters follow different patterns, but even catastrophes of the 
same type but in remote geographic locations fit into different models. A 
large number of models use the so-called cluster processes, where the 
occurrence of one event is accompanied by a cluster of secondary points. 
Examples are the Neyman-Scott model and the Bartlett-Lewis model, 
habitually used for modeling earthquakes and heavy rainfalls (empirical 
analysis and a comparison of these models and their extensions can be 
found, for example, in Vere-Jones (1970), Ogata, Vere-Jones (1984), 
Rodriguez-Iturbe et al (1987), Ogata (1988)). As Rodriguez-Iturbe et al 
(1987) puts it, "the difference between the two is minor, ... it is very unlikely 
that the empirical analysis of data can be used to choose between them." 
Both models are based on the Poisson process of cluster centres; the only 
difference is in the distribution of the secondary points around the centre. 
In the Neyman-Scott model, these points are independent and identically 
distributed, while in the Bartlett-Lewis model the inter-arrival times 
between successive points are independent and identically distributed. 
Below, we will show how the results of Subsection 2.2a can be incorporated 
in the Neyman-Scott model.
In the Neyman-Scott model (see Cox, Isham (1980)) Poisson process K, with 
constant rate p describes the process of cluster centres 27. For each cluster 
centre, there is an associated with it random number O, of secondary points 
with locations Ty, j  = 1,2,__0\. It is assumed that
• the offsets Ty -  Tj are independent and identically distributed around 
the cluster centre
• Oi and Ty -  F, are independent of one another, of Kt and of the Ok and 
77/ for k =*= /.
For the rainfalls, the assumptions are more specific, that is, O, has Poisson
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distribution with mean a, and the "offsets" Ty -  Tj are exponentially 
distributed with mean Mb. The cluster centre is not observed, but the 
cluster points are. Under these conditions, one can show (see Karr (1991)) 
that this Neyman-Scott cluster process is a doubly stochastic Poisson
t
process Kt with directing intensity Xt = ab J e~b^ d K u. For a deeper account
o
of the theory we refer the reader to Vere-Jones (1970) and Ogata (1988).
The assumptions about the claims arrival processes and the claim size 
distributions remain as before, and the catastrophe arrival processes are 
independent of claims arrival processes and claim sizes. Finally, the claims 
and the catastrophes do not arrive simultaneously. Below we shall see that 
in this case the remaining risk is calculated in almost the same way as in 
Subsection 2.2a, Table 2 (see also (2.26)). We only have to replace the 
deterministic intensity \i of the process Kt with the directing intensity
i
Xt = ab J e~b^ ~u)d k u for the process K t:
The index-specific components of the remaining risk (2.16) for the indices 
£>(') _ £)(5) kg simiiar to those calculated in Subsection 2.2a:
{d<V^ \D^ >, y
d<DW>,
E [ Z 2 ] a P }- i - ( E [ ^ ] ) 2 e [  1 1  \ a b \ e - h ^ d k u
i = l .,=0
E [ Z 2 ] J U , W + ( E [ Z ] ) 2 E
1=1
T-t
abJ Y dk„
y  [ (EZ)2E[  1 H ’w*
d< D a>>,
(d<v"\DW>, y
d<DW>,
n j  n 1 • \  •
E[z2]2 A'W+(EZ)2E X I ^ \s)ds ab^e-^dk,,
/=2 V '= 2  v= 0  J  0
■dt.
■dt.
(E[Z])2^ A,(i)+E ^  j  ^ ( s ) d s  j  ^  j Va b j e ^ ' ^ d k u
o J
n
E
;=l
(E[Z])2^ A,(i)+E
l , W + E
[ Q
f x M ^ l
_ V f=l s=0 J
f  X j M ^ t
A  pi i=o
t
a b ^ e ~ bC~
0
u )d k „
V
a b ^ ' - ' ^ d k , ,
o J
t - \
~  f  n T-< \ 2 ~
X K ! ^V i = l  , = 0  J
I
a b j e - * l™ > d k „
0
dt.
dt.
(2.78)
(2.79)
(2.80)
(2. 81)
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2
{d<v \^D^ >, y
d<D™>,
The further improvements of the model may go in the direction of allowing 
for the change in the magnitudes of the cluster points: for example, in 
earthquake modelling the energy released with the subsequent shocks 
decreases gradually, following roughly an exponential distribution 
(Vere-Jones (1970)).
Summary
In Chapter 2, we considered the problem of hedging the catastrophe risk in 
the insurance market consisting of n companies. We introduced five 
hypothetical tradeable indices: two based on weighted total losses for the 
industry, with and without the hedging company, two based on weighted 
total number of claims with and without the hedging company, and the 
severity index based on the sum of the severities of the catastrophes within 
the specified time period. Four shot-noise intensity models for the 
companies’ losses, in the descending order of generality, have been 
presented, and for each of them, we have obtained the closed form formulae 
for the intrinsic risk associated with hedging the indices named above.
A detailed comparison of the hedging error was possible for the model with 
proportional catastrophe exposure among the companies. In that case, the 
best index was the one based on the total losses. The index based on the 
total number of claims was second, and the severity index was third. 
Indices which excluded the hedging company were the worst, and we 
explained the reason for such order by employing the martingale 
representation theorem for point process martingales. Also, the formulae 
for the intrinsic risk via the coefficients of the index’ martingale 
representation allow to apply the results for the real catastrophe indices.
The results of the research can be used for the existing catastrophe models.
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This is illustrated in the example for the Neyman-Scott earthquake model 
at the end of Chapter 2. Additionally, the results are in the form where 
they can be tested for real indices. Indeed, some of the indices used in this 
Chapter are similar to the kind currently calculated by the PCS. The 
accumulating amount of data on catastrophes, together with the increasing 
interest in catastrophe derivatives, would make this testing easier.
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Chapter 3. Mortality bonds in the Markov chain 
environment
3.1 Mortality risk market - history and recent development
The issue of longevity and mortality risk has been around for centuries; 
according to Tett, Chung (2007), "The very first time that the British state 
issued a bond - back in the 17th century to fund a war against France... 
The scheme was devised by Lorenzo Tonti, a Neapolitan economist, and 
inherited his name "tontine". The government raised money by selling a 
bond, and then paid bondholders a lump sum each year, divided among the 
investor pool. Tontines had to be held by a single, named investor, and these 
instruments expired when that person died. So bond payments were 
divided each year among the remaining tontine holders, ceasing when the 
last tontine holder died."
The first tontine was issued in 1693, and soon became very popular in 
Europe. But, as time passed, tontines became more and more questionable. 
According to the same source, "the problem was that the government kept 
getting its estimates of longevity wrong. When it sold the first issue of 
tontines in 1693, it apparently expected tontine holders to live just a few 
decades. That seemed a reasonable bet at the time, and ... the early tontine 
holders included men and women of all ages. But by the middle of the 18th 
century, investors had become more canny, with the record showing most 
tontines being bought in the name of girls, usually around five years old. 
That was because girls lived longer than boys, and because there was a high 
level of infant mortality until about age four. This produced great results 
for the tontine holders, some of whom kept collecting money until their
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nineties". By the end of the eighteenth century, the government decided to 
abandon the whole scheme as it was devastating for the state financial 
system.
But the market for the mortality risk did not die, and in the middle of the 
nineteenth century a new instrument called "penny policies" was launched. 
Also, the insurance market itself continued to develop, and in the course of 
the nineteenth century many mutual-insurance societies were founded, 
providing its members with low-cost insurance. In the early-20th century, 
as Tett, Chung (2007) state, "new schemes such as pensions, saving plans 
and annuities appeared. By the 1960s, the sales of these products had 
become a multibillion-pound business".
The annuities market was relatively stable until the 1990s, when the old 
strategy of looking back at historical trends and projecting them forward 
ended up seriously underestimating future mortality rates. As Blake et al 
(2006b) report, the uncertainty of longevity projections is illustrated by the 
fact that life expectancy for men aged 60 is more than 5 years longer in 
2005 than it was anticipated to be in mortality projections made in the 
1980s. This mistake was disastrous for some insurance companies, like 
Equitable Life Assurance Society, whose guaranteed annuity options 
became very valuable in the 1990s because of a combination of falling 
interest rates and improvements in mortality, leading to a downfall of this 
organization (Cairns et al (2006a)).
However, the correct prediction of the future mortality rates is important 
not only to the life insurance companies and pensions providers with 
annuity portfolios but also to any company with a defined-benefit pension 
scheme. That is why, two centuries later, longevity securities are back and 
conquering the market, although, of course, their design has become more 
sophisticated, as have the underlying reasons for mortality rates 
fluctuations. David Blake, professor of pension economics at City
University, forecasts that the new market would eventually outstrip credit 
derivatives, which have ballooned to $26,000 billion. "The potential is 
enormous and it will start to happen very soon" (Wighton, Tett (2006)). At 
the moment, the pace is promising. Lane, Beckwith (2005) state that the
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total dollar amount in the market before 1999 was $887 million, and in 2005 
it more than doubled, reaching $1,803 million. The room for growth is 
plentiful, as, according to Blake et al (2006b), "the state and private sector 
exposure to longevity risk in the United Kingdom amounted to £2,520 
billion (or $4,424 billion) at the end of 2003 -  that is, nearly £40,000 (or 
$70,000) for every man, woman, and child in the United Kingdom".
Blake et al (2006a) suggest a number of ways of hedging longevity risk that 
amount to:
- diversification by creating a balanced portfolio of term assurance and 
annuity business;
- designing the life insurance policies so that the risk is reduced;
- securitization of the line of business exposed to longevity risk; and
- trading mortality-linked securities.
A number of studies have been done on the latter topic; some real 
instruments have also been launched. For a large part, they use the 
structures developed elsewhere in the financial theory. Mortality-linked 
securities, both existing and hypothetical, are studied in great detail in 
Cairns et al (2006a), and here we list just some examples:
- short-term catastrophe bonds (Swiss Re, Dec.2003);
- long-term longevity bonds (EIB/BNP, Nov.2004);
survivor swaps (swapping fixed for floating mortality-linked cash 
flows; some OTC trades have been done);
- annuity futures (traded contract; the underlying instrument is market 
annuity rate, many exercise dates).
But whichever way of hedging longevity risk an investor chooses to pursue, 
he will rely on some model for future mortality rates. Until recently, 
actuaries treated mortality rates at different ages as deterministic. But the 
latest unanticipated increase in longevity shows that the forces driving the 
mortality curve down are more complicated than actuaries used to assume. 
According to the Office of National Statistics (2006a), life expectancy for 
men aged 65 has increased from 13.2 years in 1983-1985 to 16.6 years, and 
for women the figures are 17.2 and 19.4 years, respectively. The mortality 
rate for women in the 55-64 age group in the past 30 years has decreased by
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approximately 44%. Of that amount, a decrease of only 8% was observed 
during the first decade, a further 21% in the second one, and an additional 
25% in the last ten years.
The reader can find a detailed survey of the models for mortality rates 
currently in use/discussion in Cairns et al (2007). The authors acknowledge 
that there is no universal "best" model; they show that England and Wales 
mortality data are in good agreement with one model while the US 
mortality data are better explained by another. However, there are some 
trends in all modern frameworks. For example, stochastic component in the 
mortality rate modelling has proved to be useful in many applications, 
especially for the policies involving certain types of a guarantee. In this 
case, the value of the mortality derivative depends on the level of interest 
rate at retirement and upon the mortality table being used by the life office 
at that time (Office for National Statistics (2006a)). The concept was first 
introduced by Milevsky, Promislow (2001), who employed a continuous-time 
diffusion process for the hazard rate. It had a Gompertz form ht = hoe8t+oY', 
Y, being a mean-reverting diffusion process. Later, Ballotta and Haberman 
(2006) created a framework for pricing of the guaranteed annuity options 
using a single-factor Heath-Jarrow-Morton framework for the term 
structure of interest rates and enriching a popular reduction factor model 
for projecting mortality rates with a stochastic component driven by an 
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process. Recently, Lin and Cox (2006) provided some 
empirical evidence for the necessity of inclusion of jump component in the 
mortality dynamics modelling and for this purpose proposed a Brownian 
motion multiplied by a jump process.
Obviously, the level of sophistication in the mortality risk analysis 
increases, and particular attention is now drawn to the specific causes of 
death. As Thomas Boardman, a policy director for Prudential, puts it, "In 
the past five years we have started to look more at the medical profession, 
and the trends behind why people die" (Tett, Chung (2007)). In line with 
this trend, Norberg (2007) proposed a new framework for evaluating and 
pricing mortality risk. The idea stems from the fact that jumps in mortality 
can be associated with advances in medical technology leading to 
eradication of some causes of death. Such events can have a strong impact
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on mortality rates: for example, an (imaginary) discovery of a universal 
treatment for cancer in 2004 would have prevented 46% of all deaths in the 
United Kingdom in the age group 55 -6 4  and 40% of all deaths in the age 
group 65 -  74 in the year to follow (data compiled from Heart Statistics 
(2005)). As all deaths can be classified by cause, and there is a limited 
number of principal death factors, one can consider the employment of the 
Markov chain modelling for the economic-demographic environment. The 
states of this environment are characterised by the causes of death still 
active at a given time. Transition from one state to another occurs with the 
elimination of an existing cause or the emergence of a new death factor. 
This approach provides a framework for analysing mortality securities 
linked to the existence of a particular death factor. When these securities 
are launched in the financial market, they would give various players in the 
pension market an opportunity to hedge against the undesirable 
components of the mortality risk.
The attractiveness of this model lies in its ability to explain and model 
jumps in mortality rates and compatibility with the other branches of life 
insurance which heavily use the Markov-chain models. A good reference is 
also Norberg (2003), where a financial market driven by a continuous time 
homogeneous Markov chain is considered together with some aspects of 
hedging in such markets.
In Section 3.2 of this chapter, we provide the description of the Markov 
chain environment applied to the mortality risk modelling and state the 
basic assumptions and features of hedging in this environment as developed 
in Norberg (2007). In Section 3.3, we look at an economic-demographic 
environment with two causes of death with the potential of disappearing 
and four combinations of related mortality bonds. We calculate the hedging 
error and the amount of bonds that should optimally be held. In Section 
3.4, we are once again concerned with finding the optimal design of a 
derivative. Using numerical data and approximations for mortality 
intensity, we apply the results of Section 3.3 to the case of a digital 
longevity bond with principal at risk to construct the optimal, in terms of 
minimising the hedging error, design of the mortality-linked bonds in this 
case. The analytical solution can not be obtained explicitly, so we run a
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computer program to obtain the numerical results for some particular 
values of the parameters. Sensitivity analysis is presented at the end of 
Section 3.4, where we study the relationship between the hedging error and 
the external and internal model parameters.
3.2 Model description and basic results
In this section we will be studying the possibilities of quadratic hedging of 
mortality derivatives in a Markov chain environment as proposed by 
Norberg (2007). The model suggests that the economic-demographic 
environment at time t can be characterised by the causes of death still 
active at that time. According to a recent chart produced by the Office for 
National Statistics (2005), more than 86% of the death toll in UK citizens 
aged 65 -  74 in 2005 is attributed to diseases of the circulatory system, 
cancer, diabetes and respiratory diseases. We suppose that these four 
diseases (and only they) can become curable with time, and group all other 
causes together and call this group "other causes", so that there are be 5 
causes of death, and the state space would consist of 16 possible states 
corresponding to various combinations of activeness and inactiveness of the 
first four causes. Transition from one state to another takes place if one 
cause of death is eliminated because of advances in medical research or a 
dramatic improvement in people’s diet and lifestyle.
Below we provide the formal description of the corresponding Markov chain 
market, followed by the theoretical facts and formulae that will be used 
later. Here we closely follow Norberg (2007).
The process (T(0),6[07] describes the evolution of the economic-demographic 
environment. The state space is finite, y  = (0,1 the starting point is
F(0) = 0. The process Y{t) is adapted to some filtration G = (Gt)te[or\ 
representing the development of the environment. We assume that Y{t) is a 
Markov chain with intensities e j  e y. By convention, a diagonal
element is minus the total intensity of transition out of the current state,
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Xee(t) = -  2  Aey(0- We assume that there exists a market for
ff*e
fs*
environmental risk, dictating an equivalent martingale measure P under 
which 7 is a Markov chain with intensities Xej{t). We denote by 
3^(0 = iffief  > 0} the set of states that are directly accessible from state e at 
time t. The cardinality of this set is denoted by ne{t).
A life insurance policy terminating at time T is issued at time 0. The state 
of the policy is a stochastic process (Z(0)?e[o,r| with the finite state space 
Z  = {0,1 starting from (Z(0) = 0. The filtration generated by Z(t) is
denoted by H = (Ht)^0 Next we assume that, conditional on Qh Z is a
A/
Markov process with intensities G Then, under P, the
process X  = (Y,Z) is a Markov chain with state space X = y x Z  and 
intensities
V..
B e j k i f ) - ,
0,
e * f j  = ^ 
e = f j  * ^  
e * f j  * k-
Next we introduce the indicator of the event that Y is in state e at time t, 
7(7(0 = e ) =  IYe{t).
and assume that there is a money market account with state-dependent 
interest rate
K0 = r Y{t) =
The insurance policy is of the standard type, with deterministic state-wise 
annuity payment functions Bj and sums assured bjk. The state-wise 
reserves are denoted by Vej(t). They are the conditional expected present 
value at time t of benefits less premiums in (/, 7], given that 
(7(0,Z(0) = (e,j). The state-wise reserves are the solutions to the
backward Thiele differential equations
dVej(t) = Vej{t)redt -  dBjit) ReJ^ k(t)fiejk(t)dt Rejfj(tjXejk(t)dt, (3.1)
k te j  f j* e
subject to the terminal conditions
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Vej(T~)  = ABj(T) = b. (3.2)
Here
Rej.ek(t) = bjk{t) + Vek(t) ~ Vej(t) (3.3)
is the sum at risk associated with a transition of the policy from state j  to
state k at time t when the environment is in state e, and
Rejfjd) = Vfj( t ) - V ej(t) (3.4)
is the sum at risk associated with the transition of the environment from 
state e to state /  at time t when the policy is in state j (no lump sum is paid 
upon such a transition). We introduce the counting processes
= | {r;0 < r < t, Y(t -)= e ,Y(r - )=J}  \ ,
the number of direct transitions of Y from state e to state /  in the time 
interval (0,/], and
N?k(t) = I {r;0 < r < /,Z(r -)=y,Z(r -)= k}\  ,
the number of direct transitions of Z from state j  to state k in the time 
interval (0,/]. The martingale
M(t) = E 
has dynamics
(3.5)
dM(t) = Z  dMveJ(t) £  + E  dMjk(t) £  (3.6)
e*f j  j±k e
where the M Yef  are the compensated counting processes of the environment 
with the dynamics given by
dMYeJ(t) = dNYeJ{t) -  IY(t)lejdt, (3.7)
the Mjk are the compensated counting processes of the policy, and their 
dynamics is
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dMfk{t) = dNjk(f) -  If{t) E  m H e A ‘)dt. (3.8)
e
The values Rejjk are the discounted sums at risk,
Remit) = (3.9)
Suppose that the market has m mortality-related derivatives with 
discounted price processes (*S',(^ )), / = In an arbitrage-free market
/v
these are martingales adapted to G under P with the dynamics of the form
dSvK0  = E  ^ i f ) d M l f f ) .  (3.10)
e*f
Consider a self-financing portfolio consisting of 0w(f) units of asset number 
/ = at time t, asset number 0 being the money market account. The
portfolio in the risky mortality derivatives, 6{t) = (0(1)( /) ,.. .,0 (w)(/))', 
t e [0,7], is a predictable stochastic process. The portfolio vector can be 
written as the sum of its state-wise values,
m  = E  l ye(t)8e(t), 0e(t) = (9^(1), .. . , 6 ^ 0 ) ) ' .
e
The discounted value process V°(t) is a martingale with dynamics
m f  m
dV>(t) = E  9 A i)d 'sA 0  = E  E  (3.11)
i=l e±f \i= 1 J
We aim to minimize the hedging error or risk, defined as the expected 
squared difference between the total discounted contractual payments and 
the discounted terminal value of the portfolio,
pe = B(M(7) -  ^ (7 ))2. (3.12)
The risk is the squared distance between the random variable M(T) and the 
linear space of T -values of self-financed portfolios in the Hilbert space of 
random variables that are square integrable w.r.t. P, the inner product
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being «  X,Y » =  E[X, Y]. Inserting
M(T) = EM(T) + \ T dM(t)
and
^(T)  = + dV6^)
and using (3.6) and (3.11), we get
p e = e [eM (7) -  (X’CO) + Jor (  E  dMlft)  E  l f m eJJ}(t)
e*f y
+E dMjk(t) E  I I W ' j A t )  -
j * k  e
(3.13)
(3.14)
+
-E E  i l { t )e f ( t )^ ( t )dM i j ( t ) ) \  =
e*fi=\
= e[]EM(7) -  P(0) + Jor ( E E  IlWej,ek{t)dMfk(t) +
j± k  e
+E ( E  i j W e i d t )  -E
i= 1
(3.15)
e * f  j
The risk above decomposes into three components
Pe = p? + p? + p i  
where
pI =  [ E M ( r > - ^ ( 0 ) ] 2
is the basis risk,
(3.16)
(3.17)
p 1 = e
= E J0 Z  7e(0 Z  JfiOkejkiORljAOd
e ji=k
(3.18)
is the non-systematic individual risk, and
p» = E
T ( m \ 
Jo E  tf(0 E  i j W e j d t )  -E
/=1
(3.19)
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is the systematic environmental risk or hedging error.
In order to avoid arbitrage, the number of risky assets with linearly 
independent dynamics in each state should be no greater than the number 
of sources of randomness ne(t) (or the number of driving martingales) in this 
state. In the case of equality the market is complete, and the environmental 
risk can be eliminated completely. If ne(t) exceeds the number of active 
securities in state e, the market is incomplete and there will be a positive 
hedging error in that state.
The basis risk is minimized by setting
F*(0) = ¥iM{T). (3.20)
The individual risk pd, does not depend on the portfolio strategy. Therefore, 
by choosing the optimal strategy, we only need to minimize the 
environmental risk (3.19).
However, in the incomplete market one will not be able to get rid of the 
hedging error entirely. To establish the optimal portfolio and calculate the 
hedging error in this case, we introduce the following notation:
the ne{t) -vector
l e ( t )  = ( r i e j i O h y e U )  (3.21)
with the elements
>leAt) = E  lf{t)RejJj(t), (3.22)
j
the ne{t) x ne(t) diagonal matrix
A e(t) = Diagfeyc(,)(Xej(t)), (3.23)
and the ne(t) x m matrix of price coefficients
^e(t) = (<^ e/(0)/e3;c(/7- (3-24)
We will assume that m < ne(t) and S e(/) has full rank m. Then the optimal 
portfolio in state e is
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§e(t)  =  ( t l ' M A e( t ) Z e ( t ) )  ]E'e( t ) A e(t)T]e(t). (3.25)
The environmental risk (3.19) in state e can be written as
p f  = E Jn E I Ye ( t ) ( r j e ( t )  - E e ( t ) O e ( t ) ) ' A e ( t ) ( j J e ( t )  - E e ( t ) 0 e ( t } ) d t (3.26)
If m = ne, both Ee(t) and Ae(0 have dimensionality ne x n e. Then (3.25) 
becomes
§e( t )  =  Z : \ t ) k - e \ ~ ! e{ t ) Y ' 3 e{ t ) K e { t ) n e { i )  =  Z~e'(t)T,e( t ) , (3.27)
and the hedging error, as pointed out above, is zero.
Armed with the main definitions, assumptions and formulae of this theory, 
we are now ready to proceed to its applications.
3.3 Two-cause model: general results
In this section we specify the demographic market y, the insurance policy 
and the mortality derivatives. We assume that there are three causes of 
death: cancer, coronary heart disease (or, simply, heart disease) and "any 
other" cause. "Any other" cause is static, while the first two causes are 
"active" at time 0, that is, cancer and heart disease are incurable at t = 0. 
When the scientists find a cure for one of the two diseases, making it 
curable, we will say that the corresponding cause of death becomes 
"inactive". Thus, the demographic market can be in one of the four states: 
y  = {active,active’, inactive,active', active,inactive', inactive,inactive} = {0,1,2,3}. 
The first word in each pair defines the state of the cancer as a cause of 
death, and the second word stands for the state of the heart disease cause. 
For example, in state 1 = {inactive,active), the treatment for cancer is already 
available but for the heart disease is not. We assume that the Markov
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process Y,, t e [0,7], which describes the state of the market, is time 
homogeneous, and the intensity matrix is
T a b l e  5 .  I n t e n s i t y  m a t r i x  Aef
e\f 0 1 2 3
0 - ( a  i + A2) X , X 2 0
1 0 - X 2 0 Xi
2 0 0 -X \ X ,
3 0 0 0 0
Remark: in what follows, X\ and A 2 can be made time-dependent; all the 
computations will carry on just the same. Below we provide a diagram of 
the environment used in our model.
D i a g r a m  6 .  M a r k o v  c h a i n  e n v i r o n m e n t , t w o - c a u s e  m o d e l .
Consider a life endowment of b with term T against level premium c 
purchased by an x -year old at time 0. There are two states of the policy: 
Z  = {0,1} = {alive,dead}. We consider a policyholder who was x years old at 
time 0, and the stochastic mortality rate at age y  is of the form
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vm(y) = v{0Kv) +  ( / J ( 0  +  4 ( 0 ) M ( , ) ( y )  +  ( / £ «  +  / i W 2 ) M - (3.28)
The component ^(1) is associated with the mortality from the first cause, 
cancer; ^(2) is attributed to the mortality from the second cause, the heart 
disease. The first element of the sum (3.28), /i(0)(y), comprises mortality 
from all other causes, and we assume here that "all other causes" cannot be 
eliminated.
Next we consider three zero-coupon digital bonds. The first two are 
disease-specific: their principal repayment amounts depend on whether the 
cure for cancer or, correspondingly, heart disease is found (in which case it 
pays out less than the original principal) or not. We label the first bond 
and its attributes with superscript C (for cancer) and call it the C-bond. 
The second bond ( H - bond) is labelled with superscript H  (for heart). The 
third bond (C H -bond) depends on the existence of the cure for cancer and 
the heart disease alike.
The pay-off function of the C -bond does not depend on whether the heart 
disease is curable or not, so it is not affected by the transition of the 
environment from state 0 to state 2 or from state 1 to state 3, which are 
associated with discovering treatment for the heart disease. Similarly, the 
H -bond is not affected by transitions from state 0 to state 1 and from state 2 
to state 3. Therefore the payoff functions for the bonds are
dSc(t) = Z  ^  {t) + & (t ) d M r23(t), (3.29)
dSH(t) = £  £,%i)dM\ft) = SU D dM U t)  + ^ ( t ) d M ru (l), (3.30)
e*f
dSCH(t) = £  £ fH(t)dMlj(t) =
= & ) d M rm (/) + t f 2"(t)dMr02(t) + t i?( t)dMlx (0 + tf?( t)dMr2](t). (3.31)
We do not specify at the moment the design of the bonds above, since some 
conclusions and formulae can be obtained in the general case. We will work 
out in detail the design of the three bonds above in Section 3.4 obtain the 
expressions for the functions £(/) for each of these bonds.
77
Now we are going to write explicitly the hedging error in these three cases. 
The C-bond and the H -bond markets are essentially the special cases of 
the C//-bond market, and we will first calculate the portfolio and the 
hedging error for the market with the C77-bond.
c h - b o n d .  First we find Ae ( t ) ,  E e ( t ) and
Ae : from Table 5, we can write the matrices
A
Ao = A] = X2 ', A.2 = X\ . (3.32)
Vectors Ee(t) and Tje { t )  are:
3o(0 = [IfftO, tS W ; = |ff(0; S2W = (3.33)
T i e ( t )  :
^0(0 =
/o(0*oo,io(0 + /f(0 * 01,l 1 (0 A
^ /o(0*00,2o(0 + /f(0*01,2l (0  ^  
771(0 = (/o (O^i 0.30 (0 + /f  (0*i 1.31 (0);
172(0 -  (/?(0*20.3o(0+/f(0*21,3l(0).
(3.34)
(3.35)
(3.36)
When the policy is in state 1 (the policyholder is dead), no assurance shall 
be paid, and the corresponding Re\j\ equal zero. Then the formulae 
(3.34) -  (3.36) can be simplified:
*7o(0 = / q(O*00,10(O
A
^ /o(0^00,2o(0 J
771 (0 = /o (0*10,30 (0;
772(0 = Iq (0 * 20,30 (0-
(3.37)
(3.38)
(3.39)
Now the application of the formula (3.25) yields
q C H _  j Z ( f )  I^00,10(0+102^(0^2^ 00,20 (0 .
0 (isrw)2x,+(?s2"w)2A2 ’
af"w  =
e ci H{t) =
|fl/(f)X2/g(Q^ io.3o(0
(IV3ww)2a2
l f j J ( 0 X | / g ( 0 ^ 2 0 . 3 Q ( 0
(&"<o) 2X.
7 ? I O , 3 o ( 0
<=13
= 4 ( 0 - 17?20,3oW
(3.40)
(3.41)
(3.42)
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The hedging error is different from zero only in state 0. It equals (see 
(3.19))
~CH 
V  Y{t)= 0
=  E -  8,1 *U,M ) ) dW l  (0 ] 2 +
+[j„4(o(tf(O *0M 0(O -
f 1 IY(t)IZ(t) 2X2^ 00.1o(/)-|S'"(Ol^ (OX2^ 00.2o(0 
J n o ^ (I?"(0)2Ai+(IS?W)2X]
-dMl\ (/) +J
+ E J o  o w ow ( |^ w) 2a,+({&"«))2Xj 02WJ
Using formula (3.7) and observing that if /J(0 = 1 then dNl^it) = dNl2(t) = 0, 
we can rewrite the last formula as
oCHr  Y{t)=0 = B |or / 0z(0 /0^ i
)  2 (0 X2f t o o , I o ( 0 - |^ ( / ) |^ ( Q X 2/?00,2q(0
( |^ (0 )2a1+(|™(/))2X2 )dt +
+  E f  4 ( / ) 4 ( 0 X 2 f  ^  dt =
J» ow ow V ({frm)!A,+(4?w)!x; J
E f [ l l ( t ) l l ( t ) l ,X2(  ) 12[ ( lo W ) 2Xi + d g H( t ) ) % ] d t  =
(I^ (/)^ 00,10(0-|^ (0^ 0Q.20(0):
( l^ (o)2x , + ( ® o ) 2x2
■dt. (3.43)
c - b o n d . Since this is a cancer-specific bond, |o2(0 = 5 m (0 = 0. From (3.25) 
and (3.26), the amount of bond to be held in state 0 is
) C 7 * \  _  1 76 ( » R o o . \ o ( 0e w ) <=01(0
(3 .4 4 )
The hedging error in this state is determined by the possibility of the 
environment transition from state 0 to state 2:
Pn ,)-„ = S [ j or7„^)/?(/)«oo.2o(0^2( o ] 2 = E jor/ 0f(0/?«£§o,2o(0X2<*. (3.45)
The environmental risk in state 2 can be completely eliminated if
2C/A _ 0^(0^ 20.30(0 
2 123(0 ’ (3.46)
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and the hedging error in state 1 will be maximal,
P?W-, = E [jo7'/[(0/f(0«io,3oW«'Mr3( 0 ] 2 = E jorI]{t)Il(t)~R\03l){tjl2dt . (3.47)
Total error then stems from the presence of errors in states 0 and 1 and 
equals
PE = P y(0=o + P y{i)= 1 =
= E l ToIr0{t)Iz0m 2m o ( t ) l 2dt + (3.48)
h - b o n d . Similarly, in this single-cause mortality derivative market, 
loi (0 = l£ ( 0  = 0. Total hedging error will be minimized if
g « ( ,) =  (3 .4 9 )
S02V-*
QH(t) = 7°(/ff lo-3o(/> ; (3.50)
CI3W
The total hedging error is equal to the sum of the errors in states 0 and 2, 
which is
P e = Py{t)=0 + p%)=2 =
= E j or 1 dt + E j Qr m i l W l o j o i O h d t .  (3.51)
Thus, as formulae (3.48) and (3.51) indicate, in the case of one cause-specific 
bond the hedging error does not depend on the design of this disease-specific 
derivative.
Formulae (3.43), (3.48) and (3.51) represent the hedging error for the 
C //-bond and the two disease-specific bonds. Next we need to find the 
survival probabilities ¥il\(t)ll(t) for the C-bond case, f°r
H — bond and E/q(0^o(0 f°r three cases: C-bond, //-b on d  and C//-bond. 
We assume that causes of death go inactive by independent mechanisms, 
and for the C -bond we find, by conditioning on the time of transition of the 
environment Y to state 1 from state 0 :
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E i\{t)F0(t) = v{Z(t) = o n n o  = 1} =
= 1 rn„p-{zW = o n r(r) = o n y(t + <*) = no = 1} =
\  - f  fi0(x+s)+ii i (x+s)+fi2(x+s)ds~ -I* /.i0(x+s)+n2{x+s)ds j  j
= J  e  Jo X\e  Jr e ^ [Te~X2td r  =
0
1 - [  fi0(x+s)+fi i (x+s)+n2(x+s)ds~ - f  fi0{x+s)+i.i2(x+s)ds j  j
= J  e  J o  X xe e~XlTe~A2tdr  =
o
~  ~  r* r fT
-(Ai+A2)/- Mo(*+s)+|U2(>w)<fr r -  m(x+s)ds~ J , ,
= <? Jo J  ^ 0 AieA|U“r)dr.
o
For the //-b on d  the required value is obtained by conditioning on the time 
of transition of the environment Y to state 2 from state 0:
i / f t 0 ^ ( 0  = P{Z{t) = o n n o  = 2} =
= | re[0 „ P{Z{!) = o n r ( i)  = o n  r(r + dr) = n o  = 2} =
~ ~ r< t rr
-U i+ A 2) H  Ho(x+s)+Ln(x+s)ds f -  ii2(x+s)ds~ j  , .
= e Jo J e  Jo X2e A2(t~T)dT,
0
and in the CH -case we have
r n m i i t )  = P{z{t) = on  n o  = 0} =
Now we rewrite the formulae (3.43), (3.48) and (3.51):
C H  _  f 7 ’ e - ( A | + X 2 ) < e _ J 0 / l 0 ^ + 5 ) + / / | ^ + ^ + / / 2 ( j f + i ^ J  J  G o Y O )# o o , i o ( 0 - | q 7 ( 0 ^ o o . 2 o ( 0 ) 2  J  / T  ^
£ J ° 1 2  © I 'M )2! , + (& " « )%  ’
r  CT - ( 1  ,+ T ,V  “ f A*o(*+s)UM(*+s)+A*2 (x+s)<fc~9 ~
£ = Jq  ^ *■ R2n20{t)X2dt +
/■r -(A]+A2) / - f  f.t0(x+$)+i.i2(x+s)ds , ~  ~  f - f  /* | (;m)<Ay T , .
+ Joe J° tf?0,3o(OW2 } e V  ex' ^ d r d t ,  (3.53)
0
» = | ore -(^ ^ 0 'e/ ^ ,”<I+s,+','C'+s)+« (^ ^ ojo(oI|rf( +
~  ~  ft t CT
*T -(A|+A2)/- \  no(.x+s)+i.i\(x+s)ds~7 ~  ~  r -  jz2(jr+s)</s t
\„e  J° Rla^{t)X\Xi j e Jo ex^M)drdt, (3.54)+ 0
We have shown so far in the formulae (3.52) and (3.53) that the hedging 
error in the market with two causes of death and with one cause-specific 
bond does not depend on the design of this bond, as long as the cause is the
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same. If both cancer and heart disease bonds are placed in the market at 
the same time, the hedging error will be eliminated completely. A less 
trivial situation occurs if the number of derivatives is smaller than the 
number of driving sources of randomness, as in the market with the 
C/7-bond, when the hedging error cannot be eliminated completely. To 
evaluate the risk associated with hedging based on the mortality derivative 
in this case, one has to specify the design of the bond and calculate the 
coefficients £ of the martingale representation of the payoff functions of the 
bonds and solve Thiele differential equations to obtain the values for the 
reserves Rejjk(t).
In the next section we are going to specify the design of the C -bond and the 
H -  bond and obtain numerical values for the amount of these assets to be 
held in the portfolio to eliminate the environmental risk; and for a specific 
design of the C/7-bond, involving two parameters r\ and rj, we will derive 
the formulae for the corresponding £ -functions and the optimal 
combination of these parameters which provides the smallest hedging error 
(3.51). We will also perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the model 
parameters.
3.4 Two-cause model: hedging error and sensitivity 
analysis
As in Section 3.3, we consider a life endowment contract of b with term T 
against level premium c purchased by an x -year old at time 0. There are 
two states of the policy: Z  = {0,1} = {alive,dead}. The state of the policy is a 
stochastic process Z,, t e [0,7]. The stochastic mortality rate at age y  and 
calendar time t is of the form
m ) W  = + a m  + m ) n i])(y) + (/£(0 + / { W 2)0') (3.55)
For simplicity, the interest rate is taken to be fixed and equal r. First, we 
will study a mortality-linked C -bond with price function Sc which pays the
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full principal if no cure for cancer is discovered by the maturity time U, and 
pays a reduced principal (1 - r  1) otherwise. The price function for such bond 
is
Sc (t) = E[e-rty( 1 - n U K U )  + I ri( .U)W,]  =
= e~rlJ -  n<rrt/ £  Irem [ l \ ( U )  + ll{U))\Y{t) =  e] =
e
=  e-ru  _ n e - ^ ( , ) E [ / [ ( L 0  + Iy} (U))\Y(t) =  0] -
- r]e-'ul \ { t )W \{U)  + I l ( U ) ) m  = 1 ] -  
-  + i i m m  = 2] -
- r xe-'ul l m { I \ { U )  + ll{U))\Y(t) = 3] =
=e~rU -  r\e~rLJ(\ -  e~'x^u~^)lQ(t)-r\e~rUl\(t)-r\e~rU(\ -  e~'Xi(u'^)l2 (t)-r\ e~rUll(t)= 
= e~rU-r \e~ rU[ (1 -  e~l ^ ) I YQ(t) + l\(t) + (1 -  e~x^ ) I Y2{t) + /£(/)]•
d~Sc (t) = + h e - l 'W-‘)lY2(t)] +
= r ^ ^ f X i ^ ' ^ / ^ O  + Xig"1' ^ / ^ ) ]  +
+ + /JCOAok*] -  + i$ ( t ) l0]dt]  =
= -r\e~rLJe~x^u~c>dMQ\ (t) -  r\e~rUe'x'(-u~^dM2i(t). (3.56)
So in the case of the cancer-specific bond we have
loi = §23 = ~r\e rU+h0 U). (3.57)
Due to symmetry, if we launch a mortality bond SH which pays full principal 
(or 1) at time U if no remedy for the heart disease is found and a smaller 
amount (1 - r i )  if such a cure becomes available, its coefficients %H will be
§02 = §13 = "r2e-r U + l (3.58)
Looking back at the formulae (3.44), (3.46) for the C-bond and (3.49), (3.50) 
for the H - bond, the amount Qce of the C-bond and 6f  of the H — bond to be 
held in state e are
5ocW = - / ? ( / ) - 5 ^ r .  (3.59)r \ e W/+A01(M/) ’
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¥2{t) =
m  =
¥ ( t )  =
2^0,310 (0 
e~rl,+io\ ’- i W ) r | e
- /g (0 -  RwM-
- m
r2e-w/+A02('-(/) ’ 
I^O,3o(0
r 2e-rll+k^ O-C)
(3.60)
(3.61)
(3.62)
Next we consider a digital mortality C H - bond with price function SCH which 
pays the full principal at maturity time U if both cancer and heart disease 
remain incurable, 1 -  r\ (or 1 -  2^) if the treatment for cancer (or heart 
disease) becomes available and 1 -  (n + 7*2) if both diseases become curable 
by time U. The natural restriction is that 0 < r\ + r2 < 1.
The price function of such bond is
S CH(t) =  E[e-rf/(I - r l [ l \ (U) + I r3( U ) ] - r 2[ i m  + I r3 ( m m  =
= e-ru _ e-rU £  { n E[/f(L0 + ll(U)\Y{t) = e] + r2E[Iv2(U) + Ir3(U)\Y(l) = e ] }  =
e
= e - r u  _ e - r V J ^ ^ j Y ^  + /^ (to ino  = 0] + r i & [IliU) +  H'(U)\y(t) =  0]}/£(/) -  
- e - ' u{nE[/{(U) + / y3m Y V )  = l]+ /-2E[/2r(f7) + /|'((7)|r(0 = ! ] } / [ « -  
-  e-rt,{/-,E[/[(C0 + /?(t7))|r(0 = 2] + r2E[4(U) + l\(U)\Y(t) = 2]} lW )  -  
-e-'-u{ r tE[l\(Lr) + ll(U})\nt) = 3] + r2W{{U) + I\{U)\Y{t) = 3]>^(() =
= e~rU -  e~r U i(l — e + | _ e~Xlt-u~^)y I^t) —
-  e~rU-{r\ + r2( 1 -  e~Xl<-u~^)y I\(t) -
-  e~rU{r i { \  -  + r2y i 2( t ) -
- e - ^ in + r zy iK l ) .  (3.63)
The dynamics is of the form
dSCH(t) = e~rU (X\r\e~?[- l^J~t) + X2r2e~X2^u~t^  Io(t)dt +
+e~rUl 2r2e~'X2^ u^ l \ { t )d t  + e~rUl\r]e~'x^u~^l2(t)dt -
- e-rUr xe-1^  ( d M ^ t )  + ll(t)H\dt) -  e-rUr2e~l2^  (dMl2(t) + IYQ(t )I2dt) -
- e-rUr2e-1^  ( dMYn {t) + l \ ( t ) l 2dt) -  ( dMY23(t) + IY2{ t ) l \d t )  =
= -e~rUr\e~k^u~^dM^{t) -  e~rUr2e~^u~^ dMQ2{t) ~
-  e-rUr2e-l ^u-t)dMYu (t) -  e-rUr\e-l ^v^dM^(t).  (3.64)
84
So the functions J™ are
|  CH = g H  = _n e -rV^(,-U)' 
%CH = | CH = _ r i e - rU *h { -U ) ,
Then the hedging error (3.52) is
|* t 2
~ C / /  f r  - ( X , + X , ) /  _ | V o(x+s)+m (x+ s)+V 2 (x+s)ds~~  ~  ( l o ^ W ^ o o . i o C O - ^ o r W ^ o o . i o W )  J  _
Pe =J0e e 12 (lff'm)2x,+(«g'M)%
f T  J  \ <  ~ f  Ho(x+s)+i.i\(x+s)+i.i2 (x + s )d s~  ~  ( r 2 e h ( ' - ^ f l 00 l o ( / ) - r i e ^ i (' ~ f / ) /?o o ,2o ( 0 )  ,
=  f J o  A 1 A 2  7    7 i -----:— :--------- r i — — d t .
J 0  ( r , * V ' - " > ) :2 l ] +  ( r 2 e h O - ^ y i 2
(3.65)
The state-wise sums at risk Reojo(t) are found as the discounted values
ReoMO = e-rt(Vjo(t)-Ve0m
and Veo are solutions to the Thiele differential equations
(3.66)
(3.67)
(3.68)
(3.69)
Ko(0  = Voo(t)r + c + (n{0){x + t) + + t) + n {2)(x + t))Voo(t) -
- X i ( F , o ( 0  -  F o o ( 0 )  - X 2( F 20(0 -  F o o ( 0 ) ,
F'ioW =  V]0(t)r + c + (/ni0)(x + t) +  /z(2)(x +  0 ) F i o ( 0  - ^ 2 {V^{t) -  F i o ( O ) ,
V2 0U) = V2o(t)r + c + (^(0)(x + 0  +  /i(1)(x + 0 ) F 20( 0  -Xi(K3o(0 -  F 2o ( 0 ) »
^ 3 0 ( 0  =  F 3o ( / >  +  c  +  / / (0)( x  +  O F 3o ( 0 .
with side conditions
Veo(T-) = b .
To find the optimal values of r \ and r2, one has to compare the hedging error
(3.65) for various combinations of r\ and r2 such that their sum is between 0 
and 1. It seems rather difficult to carry out analytical comparison, so we 
have written a computer program that solves the Thiele equations using 
some specific values of the parameters. For the sensitivity analysis, some 
parameters were fixed while others, one at a time, were allowed to assume a 
range of values.
For our basic model, the values of the parameters used in the program were
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fixed as follows:
/d0) = 0.0002 + 0.00005<?° 0381,1,0 (intensity of mortality due to all other 
factors);
/i(l) = 0.00003 + 0.00003c°038,11,0 (mortality intensity due to cancer); 
jU(2) = 0.00002c° 038,11,0 (mortality intensity due to the heart disease); 
b  = 100 (pension endowment); 
jc = 40 (age at purchase of the policy); 
r = 0.05 (interest rate);
A i =0.04 (intensity of finding cure for cancer);
X2 = 0.06 (intensity of finding cure for the heart disease).
M ortality intensity is of the form n = 6\ + 02e0iin]O, and we will refer to 6\ as 
the first coefficient and to 62 as the second coefficient of the intensity 
representation.
First, we studied dependence between various combinations of values of the 
param eters r\ and r2 and the hedging error. The resulting output is 
provided in Graphs 7 and 8.
G r a p h  7. H e d g i n g  e r r o r  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  r\ a n d
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G r a p h  8. H e d g i n g  e r r o r  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  n  w h e n  n  + r2 = 1
Graph 7 shows that the risk can be reduced virtually to zero along a line in 
the r\ - r i  plane. If we dissect the hedging error surface with the vertical 
plane containing the line r \ + r i =  1 (or any other line of the type 
r i + ri = const), we will see that the ratio — at which risk is minimal is the 
same for each constant. This is due to the fact that the hedging error (3.65) 
can be written as a function of
~ C H  f 7  ( J  4-1 V  I* / < o U + U + / '  I {x+s)+ii2(x + s)d s~  ~  | o ( / ) — ^ - e 1 i (,~ , / ) ^ 00i2o ( / ) ) 2
p F = e o AiA2-^-— : ~ ——dt.Jo (n.eA,(^)2Il+(eJ2(M0)2x2
For our particular model specification, the optimal ratio approximately 
equals 1.61; that the ratio is greater than one can be explained by mortality 
associated with cancer being higher than that associated with heart disease.
Next, using the parameters as above, we study how the ratio depends on the 
parameters of the model. Additionally, we look at the annual premium, 
that is, the amount to be paid by the insured after the purchase of the 
contract until pension age. It depends, among other factors, on the 
intensities of finding cure for cancer and heart disease and on the age at 
purchase. Graphs 9 and 10 depict the dependence between the annual 
premium c (along the right-hand vertical axis) and the second coefficient in 
the formula for /d') and /d2) correspondingly. Our analysis has shown that 
the annual premium c is almost insensitive to the changes in the first 
coefficient for //(l) or within a reasonable range. Along the left-hand side 
vertical axis we depict the ratio 7J* which minimizes the hedging error.
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G r a p h s  9 ,  1 0 .  R a t i o  a n d  a n n u a l  p r e m i u m  c  a s  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  o f
SECOND COEFFICIENT OF p (l) and SECOND COEFFICIENT OF /Z(2)
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An increase in the second coefficient means a more significant contribution 
of the particular disease to the total mortality. Correspondingly, finding a 
cure for this disease will have a larger impact on mortality. We can see, 
therefore, the expected relationship in the graphs above: the larger 
contribution of the total mortality is attributed to a disease, the more hedge 
is required for the event that the cure is found.
Shown on graphs 11 and 12 is the relationship between the risk-minimising 
ratio -fv and the intensity of finding cure for cancer and the heart disease. 
In graph 11, X\ varies within the range (0,0.25) and A 2 equals 0.06, while in 
graph 12, A 2 changes between 0 and 0.25 and A| equals 0.04.
G ra p h s  11, 12. R a t i o  ^  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e n s i t y  o f  f in d in g
CURE FOR CANCER ( I | )  and CURE FOR HEART DISEASE (X2)
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Minimum of the ratio is attained for X\ = 0.08, A 2 being fixed, and 
maximum is achieved if A2 = 0.1, A| being fixed.
Finally, we look at the sensitivity of the ratio to the external parameters, 
namely, risk-free rate and the age at the time of purchase of the policy. 
Graphs 13 and 14 illustrate how the ratio tj- and the annual premium 
depend on the risk-free rate and the starting age of the policy, 
correspondingly. We can also see that the graphs, with proper scaling, are 
nearly the mirror images of one another due to the fact that the high 
interest rate has essentially the same impact on the annual premium and 
75- as the early purchase of the policy.
G r a p h s  13, 14. R a t i o  an d  a n n u a l  premium c  a s  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e
RISK-FREE RATE r and AGE X AT PURCHASE OF THE POLICY
CL 100 *
R i s k - f r e e  r a t e A g e
We have shown so far that the design of the CH - bond can be optimized, in 
the sense of minimizing environmental risk for the insurance company, by a 
suitably chosen combination of the parameters r\ and r-i.
Sum m ary
The aim of this chapter has been to address the problem of risk 
minimization using the tools and methods of the Markov chain theory in 
economic-demographic environment. For the purpose of hedging mortality
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risk, a four-state demographic environment was considered, with the states 
denoting activeness or inactiveness of each of the two potential death 
causes, cancer and heart disease. Decreases in mortality rate were 
attributed to discovering the cure for one or both of these diseases. The risk 
for an insurance company evolves as the policyholders may live longer than 
estimated if one or both causes of death are eradicated. Partial protection 
against this sort of risk may come in the form of mortality derivative(s).
We considered three bonds: two disease-specific and one "joint", depending 
on curability of each of these diseases. We have shown that in the case of 
disease-specific security, the hedging error does not depend on the design of 
the security so long as it is based on the same disease. In the case of the 
"joint" bond, the design does matter, as the number of sources of 
randomness exceeds the number of mortality derivatives in the market. We 
have restricted our analysis to the specific design of the bond, which pays 
1 - r \  or 1-^2 at terminal time U if the cure for cancer or heart disease, 
correspondingly becomes available, and 1 -  (n + 7*2 )  if both diseases become 
curable.
Since analytical results are unattainable in this case, a computer program 
helps to find optimal, in terms of reducing risk for the insurance company, 
values for r\ and 7*2. Sensitivity analysis is provided at the end of Chapter 
3. The methods described and used in this Chapter can be applied to any 
mortality derivative. One problem left open is the interests of potential 
buyers of such a bond. Taking these interests into account might lead to 
further interesting analysis/conclusions. Another interesting extension of 
the model discussed would be a further complication of the model by 
introduction of extra causes of death and derivatives linked to the existence 
of these causes. A more sound estimation of some of the model parameters, 
like the intensity of the elimination of death causes would also improve the 
analysis of the environmental risk.
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Chapter 4. Multiperiod and continuous Pareto-optimal 
risk exchanges
In this chapter, we will be considering the Pareto-optimal redistribution of 
risk in insurance. The main goal is to extend the results of the existing 
one-period Pareto-optimality theory to the multiperiod and continuous 
cases. This would be helpful for insurance companies which may wish to 
hedge their risks by forming a pool and reallocating risks among 
themselves.
The one-period theory is already well developed. It was initiated by Borch 
(1960), (1962), who was "the first to take the ... general approach of deriving 
the optimal insurance policy form endogenously", as stated by Raviv (1979). 
In the next two decades, the theory was deeply and extensively developed 
by Arrow (1964), Borch (1974, 1986), Buhlmann and Gerber (1978), Gerber 
(1978), Buhlmann and Jewell (1979), Raviv (1979), Buhlmann (1980), 
(1984). A good unification of their work was created by Taylor (1992) and 
Aase (2002). An extensive list of references can be found in Kaluszhka 
(2004).
Recent research in Pareto-optimal risk redistribution has gone in various 
directions. In some papers the general theory is adjusted for a case with 
limitations of some sort. For example, Golubin (2005) considers optimal risk 
exchanges when treaties are allowed only between the insurer and each 
insured separately, not among the insured themselves. Other researchers 
seek to extend the existing theory by relaxing constraints. Ermoliev and 
Flam (2001) find Pareto-optimal insurance contracts when the underlying 
loss distribution is unknown. A number of works are concerned with 
financial applications of the Pareto-optimality theory.
Since the Pareto-optimality concept is so popular, it seems beneficial to
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extend it beyond the one-period range. An attempt of this kind was recently 
undertaken by Barrieu, Scandolo (2007), who have studied the 
Pareto-optimal risk exchanges between two agents in the expected utility 
framework. The form of the risk exchange in their work is obtained as a 
solution of a sup-convolution problem between the agents’ modified 
preference functionals. The authors have proved that for the case of 
bounded risks and concave utility functionals in the real vector space the 
n -period Pareto-optimal risk exchange is characterised by the same ratio of 
marginal utilities in each direction.
In this chapter, we start with reporting the basic results from the 
one-period Pareto-optimality theory in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2 we 
discuss the potential applications of the multiperiod model and, based on 
these considerations, we propose two multiperiod utility functionals, one 
based on the accumulated losses occurred by the end of each period and the 
other based on the incremental losses, and introduce two corresponding 
definitions of multiperiod Pareto-optimal risk exchanges (POREX). Then in 
Section 4.3 we investigate the properties of the multiperiod POREX defined 
as above. By using a technique different from Barrieu, Scandolo (2007), we 
achieve the main result for each of the functionals: under some constraints, 
the ratios of marginal utilities of each pair of agents is almost surely 
constant and is the same for each year of the multiperiod Pareto-optimal 
treaty. This essentially means that a multiperiod POREX can be arranged 
as a sequence of one-period POREX’s which maximize the same linear 
combination as in the Theorem 4.7 below.
In Section 4.4, we develop the Pareto-optimality theory for the continuous 
case. We partially borrow the technique employed by Barrieu, Scandolo 
(2007) to prove that the continuous POREX, as the multiperiod one, can be 
reduced to the one-period case: it can be organized by specifying in advance 
the ratio of marginal utilities between each pair of agents and keeping it 
constant in the course of the treaty.
92
4.1. One-period Pareto-optimal risk exchanges: basic facts
Here we are going to describe the framework and the basic properties of the 
one-period Pareto-optimal risk exchanges. The insurance industry in 
consideration includes n companies, or agents, A\,. . . ,A„,  which provide 
insurance against closely related hazards. Each agent faces a random risk 
and is willing to exchange parts of their risk through a mutual agreement. 
Agent A,’s attitude towards risk is reflected by a utility function u/(co), 
i = l T h e s e  functions are assumed to be twice continuously 
differentiable, with Uj{co) > 0 and Uj(co) < 0 for all /. Each agent Aj,  
i = 1 is endowed with a random payoff X\(&>), i = 1 whi ch is his 
initial risk share, including the effect of any direct premium and claims. 
The random variables X,(&>) are defined on the same probability space and 
are square-integrable. We will also need the total initial risk within the 
group, X{co) = Xi(co). The sigma-algebra
T  = o{Xi(co), i =
represents the information about the initial risk allocation. The agents can 
enter into risk exchanges (REX) resulting in a new set of random variables 
Y = {F,(&>)}, i = 1 whi ch equal the agent’s possible final payout. A 
REX must satisfy two conditions:
C o n d i t i o n  4.1. {information condition) The risk shares under the treaty 
can only depend on the amount of information available at that time, X,(<y) 
is adapted to T, i =
C o n d i t i o n  4 . 2 .  (clearing condition) No inflow or outflow of capital takes
n n
place (the group is closed), T,(co) X,{co) = X(co).
i= 1 /=!
The risk exchange which satisfies both conditions above is called 
admissible. From now on, we will often omit the argument after risk 
exchange function and write just A, or T, instead of Xi{co) or X,(cw), always 
bearing in mind their random character.
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To be able to compare different risk exchanges, we employ the standard 
expected utility as the agents’ preference functional, so the agent A/ s  
satisfaction associated with its risk share T,- is evaluated as the expected 
utility Eu(Yj). It is, of course, impossible to find a risk exchange that is 
optimal from the isolated point of view of each individual agent. Since the 
total income (or losses) is to be shared, any increase of one agent’s share 
must be compensated by decreasing the shares of some of the others. This 
being so, a natural first step is to identify those treaties that are worth 
negotiating and rule out those which can easily be improved by increasing 
expected utilities of some agents while the expected utilities of the others 
are not impaired. This property is summarized in the following
D e f i n i t i o n  4.3. An admissible REX Y = {T,}, i = \ , . . . , n ,  is called 
Pareto-optimal risk exchange (POREX) if there is no admissible allocation 
Z  = {Z,}, i = 1 wi t h EUj{Zj) > Ew,(T,) for all i and with Ewy(Z7) > EUj(Yj) 
for at least one agent Aj.
Pareto-optimal risk exchanges form a subset in the set of all admissible risk 
exchanges. Similar thing can be said about the filtrations to which they are 
adapted. The minimal filtration to which Pareto-optimal risk exchanges are 
adapted is a sub-a-algebra of T  generated by X, T x c  T. This result will be 
proved in the Theorem 4.5, but first we have to introduce a
D e f i n i t i o n  4.4. A REX Y = {T,}, / = 1 is ca lled  global  i f  th e  r isk  
sh a res  fy, i = 1 are functions  o f  the  tota l incom e(loss) X.
P r o p o s i t i o n  4.5. A risk exchange Y = {T,}, i = 1 is Pareto-optimal
only if it is a global REX.
Proof. DSuppose Y  = (Y\, Y2 , ... Y„) is an arbitrary risk exchange, and
n
Yl Y j = X .  We define a new risk exchange Y = (Ti, Y2 , . .. Yn) so that
/= 1
Yj = EfT/l^]. Then Y is admissible, since
2  Y, = £  E[Y,\FX] = E E  Yi\Px] = X.
/=! /=! /=!
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Also, the expected utilities of the agents under Y  are not smaller than under 
Y, because by Jensen’s inequality for every agent i, i = and the
concavity of the utility functions
E[ui(Yi)] = EpEtu/Cr,-)!^]] < E M E ir ,!^ ])] = E|>,(7,)]. (4.1)
The equality for all z, i = 1 , . . . , z? is achieved if and only if the initial REX 
was already global. If the inequality (4.1) is not strict for at least one z, for 
agent Aj the expected utility E[w,(r,)] will be strictly greater than E[w,(7,)], 
which means that the treaty Y improves Y in the sense of 
Pareto-optimization, and the pool would prefer REX Y  to the initial REX 
YM
Theorems 4.6 and 4.7 provide further necessary conditions for POREX, and 
we formulate them without proof. The reader can find it, for instance, in 
Aase (2002).
T h e o r e m  4 .6 . A risk exchange Y = {7,}, i = 1 is Pareto-optimal if and 
only if the ratios between the marginal utilities w[(T,) are almost surely 
constant, that is, there exist constants 0,, / = 1 ,..., n such that
u’iiXi) = Qiu\(Y\), a.s., i = \ , . . . , n  (4.2)
Necessarily, 6i must be strictly positive, and 9 1 = 1.
T h e o r e m  4.7. A risk exchange Y = {T/}, i = 1 is Pareto-optimal if and 
only if it is a solution to the following optimization problem with some fixed 
strictly positive constants a,, i = 1 :
n
maxj^ tf/E[w(F,)] over all admissible REX.
/=i
Later (see Lemma 4.14) we will show that the constants at and 4~ are 
essentially the same for any POREX, and for the multiperiod and 
continuous framework we will use the two formulations interchangeably.
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Having stated the assumptions and results for the one-period theory, we 
move on to formulating an analogous multiperiod theory and investigating 
the properties of the multiperiod POREX.
4.2 Potential applications of the multiperiod model
Once the one-period Pareto-optimal risk exchanges have been introduced 
and studied, the natural further step is to generalize the concept of 
Pareto-optimality for the multiperiod setting. How can we define the 
structure of Pareto-optimal REX in this case, and what are the potential 
applications of it? In this respect, it is instructive to look at the various 
real-life examples of optimization and the implied models.
First, let us consider a hedge fund. A fund is marked to market at least 
daily. The goal is to consistently make money, and ability to do so at present 
matters more than whether one was successful in the past. While a 
short-term losing streak may be tolerated, risk management systems will 
often ensure that risky positions are taken off when losses reach a certain 
limit (a more sophisticated version of the stop-loss selling rule). A longer 
period of losing money is likely to result in either dismissal of the fund 
manager responsible or in withdrawal of client money. The latter has 
essentially the same impact of forcing the fund to liquidate positions. As a 
rule of thumb, a fund manager’s strategy will be seriously questioned after 
two months of underperformance, and two quarters of negative returns may 
see the fund fold.
From the above, the following qualitative observations about a hedge fund’s 
utility function can be made:
- tolerance for losses is not high (risk controls and stop-loss rules)
- time horizon for evaluating returns is shorter
- incremental returns rather than cumulative returns matter (dismissal 
for short-term underperformance).
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A somewhat different set of observations can be made about the so-called 
“real money”, such as mutual fund, investment management organizations. 
The time horizon for positions is typically longer and is measured in months 
rather than days. While funds are also marked to market on a daily basis, a 
fund manager is unlikely to be fired if a position has lost money over two 
months. In addition, while clients look at short-term performance, they also 
tend to pay attention (rightly or wrongly) to the past track record.
In terms of the utilities in the short and long run, this can be summarized 
as follows:
- time horizon for evaluating returns is longer
- tolerance for risk at such horizon is higher (and is certainly higher 
than that of a hedge fund on a shorter horizon)
- both incremental and cumulative returns matter.
Finally, a typical buy-and-hold investor, such as an insurance company, 
provides still another example. The portfolio of securities is usually 
designated as held to maturity (rather than trading for hedge funds and 
mutual funds). This means that such securities (usually bonds) are not 
required to be marked to market (even though most institutions do so for 
internal purposes). Instead, provisions are taken against possible losses 
based on certain rules. For example, securities may have to be written 
down if their prices fall below a threshold and such impairment is likely to 
be permanent. Losses, therefore, can come either from defaults or some 
such permanent impairment. The threshold is usually set as a percentage 
of par, allowing for a degree of volatility without triggering the write-down. 
Such an approach results in a greater tolerance for losses in the medium 
term (quarters, as opposed to days and months). Because managers of 
insurance companies tend to have longer time horizons (as compared to 
fund managers), they are more likely to look at cumulative returns rather 
than short-term incremental returns.
The following, therefore, can be said about utility curves of such 
buy-and-hold investors:
- time horizon for evaluating returns is long (the shorter of maturity, 
default, or price falling below the write-down threshold)
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- within the limits of the write-down threshold, tolerance for losses is 
high (but losses are typically smaller, on a relative basis, than in hedge 
funds!)
- cumulative returns matter perhaps more than incremental returns.
Another potentially interesting application of this theory is the well-known 
agency problem that arises between company managers and shareholders. 
Should the management take decisions that they believe will create value 
for the company in the long term even if that means sacrificing some 
short-term earnings? Or should they pay attention mainly to making sure 
quarterly earnings please investors, perhaps to the detriment of somewhat 
more ambitious long-term plans?
Having in mind the considerations above, in the next subsection we propose 
a definition of a multiperiod risk-exchange together with the conditions it 
must satisfy. Then, to be able to compare risk exchanges, we need to 
introduce some measure of attractiveness of a risk exchange to an agent. In 
Subsection 4.2b we offer three satisfaction criteria together with the 
definitions of the corresponding Pareto-optimal risk exchanges and study 
their properties and the connections among them in Section 4.3.
4.2a Multiperiod risk exchanges - definition
In the multiperiod model, as in the one-period setting, we will be 
considering n agents A\ , A2 , . . .,A„, all operating in more or less the same line 
of risky business and seeking possibilities of reducing individual risk 
through co-operative arrangements. They would typically look to share 
losses, but may aim to redistribute profits as well. At the outset each agent 
Aj has a random net income (for example, premiums less paid claims) \/Xit in 
year t = 1,.. . ,  T. The sum of all agents’ risks in year t is denoted by v X t. We 
assume that the risks are bounded. The sigma-algebra
T t = cr{vA,r}; / = 1 , 2 , . . . , « ;  x = 1, . . . , / ,
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comprises the information available at time t, and the filtration 
F= 2 t  stands for the flow of information over time. In order to
reduce their individual risks, the agents enter into negotiations of treaties 
for mutual exchange of risk among them for the T years.
D e f i n i t i o n  4 .8 . A T-period risk exchange {R E X ^ jf )  is  a se t  o f  random
variables Y  = {V fy ,;  i = 1,2,__ ,n; t = 1 where v Y it is the net income
of agent Aj in year t under the treaty.
A REX must satisfy two conditions. Firstly, the information condition 
which states that the amounts exchanged in any year t, v Y ,  = {V F „ ;  
/ = can only depend on the information available at that time;
v y ,  e J E ,  t = l , . . . , r .  (4.3)
(In other words,................ ...t  is adapted to F). Secondly, since the group of n
agents is closed (makes no money transactions with third parties), a REX 
must also satisfy the clearing condition (or budget constraint)
E  v h ,  = £  V A „ =  VX'.  (4.4)
,=i ,=i
Let us introduce the accumulated net incomes F„ by period t,
t
y „ = X l v r r t ,  V Y „  =  1, / = 1 , t = \ , . . . , T ,  (4.5)
r= l
defining F,o = 0. In particular, these definitions apply to the trivial
exchange (or rather ’no exchange’ ) X =  {V A „;  i =  1 , 2 ,  ,rc; t =  1 , . . . , 7 } .
Due to (4.5),  the information condition (4.3) implies that
Y( e J-t, t ,T, (4.6)
and the clearing condition (4.4)  can equivalently be cast as
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Z  x/7 = £  t = i , . . . ,r .  (4.7)
/=i /=i
where Xt stands for the total accumulated net income by period t within the 
group.
4.2b Multiperiod Pareto-optimality
We suppose that, in the multiperiod setup, every agent’s attitudes towards 
risk in year t are described by his/her individual utility function w„ as in the 
one-period model. The usual assumptions are that, for /'= and
t = 1 ,..., T, these functions are concave, increasing and continuously 
differentiable on the closure of the support of probability measure. In 
general, utility functions uit may change over time as the attitudes of the 
agents are not necessarily constant.
At the beginning of Section 4.2, we described several considerations of the 
factors that may influence the form of the satisfaction criterion of an agent. 
Taking these considerations into account, we propose three utility 
functionals which agent A,-, i = can use to value a given REX Y.
These satisfaction functionals are labelled by superscripts in the round 
brackets, and the symbol V-*} will be used if the exact form of the functional 
is not important:
T
C w  = E  E [ w „ ( v r / , ) ] ,  ( 4 . 8 )
r-1
V?{Y) = £  E[u„(Yu) l  (4.9)
r=l
V'-'iY) = E[m,t(1V)]. (4.10)
The first functional F-'^Y) will typically be employed by businesses like 
hedge funds, for which it is mostly incremental income that matters. 
Businesses that are interested in the cumulative changes of income are 
more likely to measure their utility with the satisfaction functional Vf\Y) ,
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which sums total income at the end of each year t < T. The final version 
may reflect the preferences of the long-term investors interested mostly in 
the final utility. In fact, Fj3)(Y) is a one-period expected utility for the time 
period of length T, beginning in year 0 and ending in year T.
It is also possible that the market players choose to employ more than one 
criterion. For example, they may combine the first and the third one or the 
third and the second criteria, as the utility of the final position in year T 
may be of particular importance. However, it will be shown that, with 
appropriate constraints, the first and the second criterion are equivalent 
and entail the fulfilment of the third one.
It is, of course, impossible to find a risk exchange that is optimal from the 
isolated point of view of every individual agent. Under the clearing 
constraint (4.4) any increase in one agent’s share must be compensated by a 
decrease in the shares of the others. This being so, a natural first step is to 
identify the treaties that are worth negotiating. Thus we introduce
D e f i n i t i o n  4 .9 . A multiperiod Pareto-optimal risk exchange REX^^t) Y  
under criterion (*), (POREX^l  ^ Y) is an exchange which cannot be replaced 
by another REX(\_j) Y  such that under Y, satisfaction for at least one agent 
increases while for the rest of the group it does not decrease:
t Y  : V (; '(Y)  < V ' ; \ Y )  (4.11)
for some /', 1 < i < n, and Vj*\Y) < V(/ }(Y), j  = 1 Another equivalent 
way of putting it is to say that if a REX^^t) Y  is Pareto-optimal and 
(Y) < V^\Y)  for some i, then we must also have (Y) > Vj*}(Y) for some 
other j.
Since no agent is forced to enter a risk exchange, a POREX^   ^ Y  must 
satisfy the feasibility condition
V f \ Y )  > V]'\X),\ /i .  (4.12)
Suppose that there exists a feasible POREX. Then a risk exchange that is
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not a POREX can be excluded since it can be replaced by some other REX 
that improves the position of at least one agent without impairing the 
position of any other agent. Thus, the negotiable treaties are precisely the 
feasible Pareto-optimal ones.
4.3 Properties of the multiperiod Pareto-optimal risk 
exchanges
As in the one-period case, we want to establish the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of the treaties that are Pareto-optimal under one of the 
satisfaction criteria given by (4.8), (4.9). In Subsection 4.3a, we start with 
setting forth the necessary conditions under the second satisfaction 
criterion (4.9) and then proving similar statements is case of the first 
criterion (4.8). Then we move to the sufficient conditions in Subsection 4.36. 
These conditions will also establish the connection between the one-period 
and the multiperiod Pareto-optimal risk exchanges.
4.3a Necessary conditions for a multiperiod POREX
Let us denote by T x' = <j {X,} the sigma-algebra generated by the total
accumulated income of the group in year t. The T x\  t =  1,__ ,T, do not
constitute a filtration. It is obvious that for every Pareto-optimal risk 
exchange Y, Yt e Txt ' c: must hold for t = to satisfy the clearing
condition. Let ^  be a sigma-algebra such that T x' ^  7 t c= T t, t = 1,__ , T.
Thus, the ^  represents a flow of information that may be summary and 
with an imperfect memory but retains the information about the total 
accumulated group incomes. Let Y= {Yit} be some REX^ d and define 
Y = {Yit = E[F,y|?T]}. Then Y, is a REX(\^d > ^ trivially satisfies the 
information condition (4.6), and it also satisfies the clearing condition since
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E  Y„ = E  n ju \% \  = E E  = E [E  X ' f f i  = E  Xu = X,. (4.13)
/=1 /=1 /=1 z'=l /'=!
Next, we show that under the satisfaction criteria given by (4.9), every 
agent will enjoy an increase in the level of satisfaction, or at least his level 
of satisfaction will remain the same, under REX^^t) Y  compared to REX(o,...,r) 
Y. By Jensen’s inequality and from the concavity of the utility functions 
i = 1 t — 1, . . . , T
V?t(Y) =E  E[m ,v(7,v)] =E  E [ E [ H „ ( r „ ) | ? q ]  <
1=] t= I
< E  E [ a « ( E [ r „ | ^ ] )  ]  = E  E [ « / , (? / , )  ]  = V'a{Y).  (4.14)
t= 1 t=\
Therefore, all agents would prefer REX^^^t) Y  to REX^^t) Y. The argument 
also says that should be chosen as small as possible, which means that 
= X'} ; otherwise one could improve on the position of all agents by 
conditioning anew on T xi We conclude:
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 . 1 0 .  A necessary condition for a REX(i t )  Y  to be a
POREX^  7} is that
Yu g X I  / = 1 r  (4.15)
In other words, the risk shares Yit must be functions of X, only.
A sufficient condition is not easy to find. The reason is the special form of 
the utility criterion (4.9), which adds the expected utilities for all years. 
However, a further necessary condition can be derived from this additive 
structure. Let Y  be a ^ that is Pareto-optimal in the sense of
definition (4.9), but for some year r, 1 < r < T, {Yit} is not a POREX in the 
one-period sense for year r problem of exchanging the accumulated 
individual incomes XiT, i = when each agent A, seeks to maximize
expected utility in year r only. Then one can find another year r REX {Yir} 
that satisfies the clearing condition in year r and is such that 
E(uiT(YiT)) < E(w,r(F,r)) for all i, with strict inequality for some j  from 
{1,2,..., A}. Taking Y,t = Yit for t ± z , we then find that Y  is not POREX$ ^
103
by the definition (see (4.11)). We conclude:
P r o p o s i t i o n  4.11. A necessary condition for a R E X ^ ^ d  Y to be a 
P O R E X j )  is that, for each year t, { Yit} is a POREX for the local year t 
problem of exchanging the accumulated incomes X t when each agent A t seeks 
to maximize his year t expected utility  E{ujt{Yu)).
This Proposition also implies that any POREX^   ^ Y  is POREX^ j^  Yfor 
any 0 < To < T, and is also Pareto-optimal for any 0 < To < T under the third 
satisfaction criterion V{j { Y ) ,  under which every agent seeks to maximize his 
final utility E[w,r(y,T)].
It follows that for Y  to be a POREX, it must satisfy the Borch conditions for 
the utility derivatives
u'it(Yi,) = 6itu'u(Y\,) a.s. (4.16)
for some positive constants 0ih i = 2,3,...,w, t = 1 ,2 ,...,T. Actually, 
Proposition 4.11 already implies Proposition 4.10 due to the well known 
result that a POREX in the one-period set-up must be a pool. An equivalent 
necessary condition in the multiperiod setting is that for each t {Yit} must 
maximize
n
E  a„E[„„(r,v)] (4.17)
/=l
over the set of all admissible REX for some strictly positive constants a it. To 
make the combination {a it}, i = 1 t = 1 uniquely defined, we set
of i/ = 1 for all t. In fact, these constants are equal to the reciprocal values of 
6it used in (4.16). If we want to maximize (4.17) for some linear combination 
{l,cc2/, ,oint} under the clearing constraint, we have to differentiate
n
X  ai,E(uit(Yi,)) with respect to T„, / = 2 ,...n  (as Y]t = Xt -  (Y2t + ...+Y„,)) and 
/= i
equate these derivatives to zero:
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51 2]a„E[M„(y„)]
dYji = - a \ tE[u\t(Yu)] + a itE[u'it(Yit)] = 0  .
=* E[u'u(Yu)] = aM u^Yit)].
Since we have at the same time that, according to (4.16), 
= 6itu\t{Y\t), a.s., we take expectations and see that 
E[uit(Yu)] = 6i,E[u\t(Y],)] so 6it must equal i = 2 We have proved so 
far
Lem m a 4.12. Each one-period POREX {7,} maximizes some linear
n
combination ajtE[uji(Yit)], and
i= 1
u,t{Ylt)) = 4 -u \ t{Yu) a.s . (4.18)
Statements similar to those in Propositions 4.10 and 4.11 can be formulated 
for the first satisfaction criterion given by (4.8). If the goodness of a 
multiperiod risk exchange is measured as in (4.8), we might reasonably 
expect that a Pareto-optimal REX during each time period / should depend 
on the total change of income during that period. Let = o { A X , }  be the 
sigma-algebra generated by the income change during year t, and - some 
sigma-algebra which includes t = l , . . . ,r .  Then for
each REX Y= {A7„} we define a new risk-exchange Y  = {AYit = E[a7,-,|^]}. 
Then Y  is a REX^o....,n; if satisfies the information requirement (4.3), and it 
also satisfies the clearing condition since
£  A 7/, = £  E [A 7„ |? f] = E |X  A 7/V|? f ]  = E [ £  A X „|?f] = A X t. (4.19)
;=1 /=! /=1 /=1
The satisfaction of each agent under risk-exchange Y  will not be less than 
that under Y, because by Jensen’s inequality and from the concavity of the 
utility functions
C O O  = £  E[w„(Ar„)] = £  e [ e [ U/,(ak„ ) |^ ] ]  <
/=1 /=1
< £  E [«„(E [A r„ |?:]) ] = £  e [ u „ ( a y u)  ] = C ( f ) -  (4.20)
/=] t=\
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Thus, all agents would agree to switch to REX Y. As for the POREX^ at 
the beginning of Subsection 4.2a, *!Ft should be chosen as small as possible, 
which means that 'T , = T f*  ; otherwise one could improve on the position of 
all agents by conditioning anew on Ff*. To put it formally, we state
P r o p o s i t i o n  4.13.  A  necessary condition for a REX^\^ ,_d  Y  to be a 
POREX\\l ■pj is that
A  t = (4.21)
It means that AYit must be functions of AX, only.
Now we are going to examine the structure of the multiperiod POREXff 
It is formulated in the following
Lem m a 4.14.  A necessary condition for a REX^^j) Y={Y it},  
i = 1 t = t \ , . . . , t 2 , to be a POREXf^  ^ is that for every t \ , t i  such that 
0 < t\ < £2 < T, {Y„}, i = 1 ,...,w, t = / ] , . . . , /2, is a POREX^^ ,2) for the local
subperiod ( t \ , . . . , t 2) problem of exchanging incomes AX, when each agent A,
h
seeks to maximize 52 E[w,7(A7„)]. In particular, it is a one-period POREX
/=(,
for every year t, 0 < t < T (in this case ti = t\ = t).
□Proof. Suppose there exists a REX^^t) Y  which is a POREX^  ^ , but is 
not Pareto-optimal for some subperiod ( t \ , . . . , t 2), 0 < t\ < £2 < T. Then for 
this subperiod there exists an alternative REXy t2) Z  which increases at 
least one agent’s satisfaction function
h 2^
52 Ei[uj,(AZj,)\ > X  Et[uj,(AYj,)] for some j, (4.22)
t=t.\ t=t 1
while other agents’ satisfaction is not impaired:
E  Wujt(AZj,)] >52 E[ujt(AYj,)], i ± j. (4.23)
Then we can construct a new REX^^t) Y  such that Yit = Z„ for t e £2]
and Yit = Yit for t £ £2]. Since the risk exchanges Y  and Z  satisfy the
information and the clearing conditions, new REX^ ^d Y  agrees with them 
as well. From (4.22) and from the construction of REX^ ^n Y  it is evident 
that for agenty,
T  t — 1 t 2 T
y ' i io h  = E  E[u;,(a?„) ] = £  E[»y,(A7y,)] + E  n uf i i& Zj , ) }  + 2  E[uj, (AYj, )]  >
1= I t=\ t=t\ t=t2 + \
> £  E[Mj,(A7y,)] =
t=  I
and for every other agent /, from (4.23) we get
T  t — 1 2^ ^
C  W  =E E[«„(a7„) ] = £  E[»„(A7„)] + £  E[««(AZ„)] + E  E[»„(A7„)] »
/=1 /= 1 '=*1 t=t2 + \
> E  E[«/,(A7f,)] = K,™(y).
/ =  1
This contradicts the assumption that Y  is a POREX^q j^. So we have proved 
that Y  must be Pareto-optimal for any subperiod [ t , t2\M
Further necessary conditions can be formulated with some additional 
assumptions. We consider a special case of time-independent utility 
functions, uit = i = 1 t = and non-decreasing risk shares for
every agent and year. We will show that in this case for the POREX$  ^
and the POREX\q  ^ the ratio of the marginal utilities is the same for each 
year. We start with a simple case of just two agents and the time horizon of 
two years and formulate the statement for the POREX^\ 2) :
Theorem 4.15. For n = 2 and T = 2 under POREX[f2) the ratio of the 
derivatives of the utility functions of the agents is the same in each year.
P ro o f. □  Suppose that we have a POREX$] 2) Y, and the total losses in 
years 1 and 2 are X\ and X2 correspondingly. We assume that the risk 
shares do not decrease, Y\\ < Y\2 and Y2\ < T22. Then, according to
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Proposition 4.11, {7n,72i} and {^12,^22} each form one-period POREX. This 
means that
w',(7ii)) = 9\u2(Y2\) a.s.
u\{Y\i)) = 02U2{Y22) a.S.
(4.24)
(4.25)
Suppose that both u\ and u'2 are continuous and, contrary to the statement 
of the Theorem, that 0 \ * 02. Then there exists a 8 > 0 such that for each 
7n from the <5-neighbourhood of Y\\ and Y2, from the 8 -neighbourhood of
T21, ulOz\) < J£i-M which implies that M2C^21) -  6 2
> In M . Then if
X 2 -X ]  < 8 ,  the risk shares 7i2 and F22 will belong to the 8 -neighbourhood
of Tii and 721 correspondingly, and u\{Y 12)
u2{Y21) -9 2 Since
F[X2 ~X] < <5] > 0, the condition (4.25) is not satisfied, the ratio u\{Y 12) UiiYn) IS
different from 92 on a set with positive measure, which contradicts the 
assumption of Pareto-optimality with w',(7i2)) = 02^2(^22) a.s. in year 2. 
Thus, the assumption 9\ * 02 is false and for both one-period POREXs the 
ratio of the derivatives of utility functions must be the same. One can also 
see that, if X 2 = 0 with positive probability, then 9\ and 02 must be the 
same. ■
Transition to n agents is straightforward, and from T = 2 to an arbitrary T it 
can be performed by induction on the number of years. The corresponding 
sufficient condition will be proved in Theorem 4.17, Subsection 4.3b.
The similar statement for the P O R E ^   ^ can not be proved in the same 
manner. However, we will prove in Theorem 4.16 that under any 
POREX^\}  ^ the ratio of the agents’ marginal utilities is the same in each 
year with additional assumptions about the model. Namely, if we consider 
exponential utility functions which are widely used in applications, and if 
total losses are identically distributed for every year, under any P O R E X  ^
the ratio of the marginal utilities should be the same for each year. The 
sufficient part of this statement follows from the Theorem 4.17 in 
Subsection 4.3b.
T h e o r e m  4.16. If the agents’ utility functions are exponential (have the
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form u(y) = -e  ay) and time-independent, under any POREX[\] ^ the ratio of 
the agents’ marginal utilities is the same in each year.
P r o o f .  □  First we will prove the statement of the theorem for n = 2 and 
T = 2. Suppose that we have a POREX^^2) Y, and the incremental losses in 
years 1 and 2 are AX\ and AX2 correspondingly, and they are independent 
and identically distributed. Let us say that the utility function of the agent 
A,-,i = 1,2 is Uj(y) = -e~aiy. First we suppose that the statement of the 
theorem is not true; that is, there exists a POREX$] 2) Y such that in year 1 
the ratio of utilities is 0 \ and in year 2 it is 02. We will show that then one 
can find 0 such that a risk exchange with the ratio of derivatives of 0 in 
every year will increase both agents’ satisfaction under the first satisfaction 
criterion (4.8).
It is a well-known fact that for exponential utility functions, the 
Pareto-optimal risk shares are linear functions of total losses. So the shares 
of the first agent in years 1 and 2 are
AYu = +
and
AYn = - ^ A X 2 + ^ l n ^ ,  
correspondingly, and for the second agent they are
A72, = ^ r A X ,-7J37l n ^  
and
A Y u  =
Then the satisfaction functionals are (we use the fact that AX1 and AX2 have 
identical distribution):
We can see that the only part that depends on 9\, 02 is
for agent 2.
for agent 1, and
We replace a°+a2 with b\ and aaxla2 with bj. It is evident that both b\ and bj 
lie between 0 and 1 and their sum is 1. We will show that one can find a 9 
such that
the existing REX^0,1,2) with the one for which the ratio of derivatives is 6 at 
every step.
From (4.26) and (4.27) we derive
0-*i < O W 1
and
0*2 < 0?2+022
equivalent to
0~h1 +9~h] < 9\b' + 0 2h' (4.26)
and
(4.27)
Next we show that the satisfaction of both agents will increase if we replace
(4.28)
and
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e < (4.29)
We just have to show that
(4 .3 0 )
r- Q S  _j_Q S  ^
The mean of degree 5 of two distinct positive numbers 6 \, 62 I '2 2 14 is an
increasing function of s on D& (because ln^  ) has positive derivative on 0&); 
in the interval [0,1] it increases from the geometric mean of # i ,02 to their 
arithmetic mean. So (4.30) does hold, and we have found a REX^2 ) which 
improves satisfaction of both agents and the ratio of utilities is the same for 
both years.
Now proceed to the general case of arbitrary n and T. Suppose there exists a 
POREX[\l ^ Y  such that there exist two agents (say, i and j)  and two years t\ 
and t2 such that the ratios of their marginal utilities are different almost 
surely in these years. Then, as shown above, their shares in years t\ and 
t2 can be changed in such a way that the sum of their losses in each of these 
years remains unchanged (so the rest of the REX Y  can be left unchanged 
and still conform with the clearing conditions), the ratio of the marginal 
utilities is the same and the sums of utilities of agents i and j  in years t\ and 
tj increase. Then the utility functional F(l) will increase for agents i and j  
and remain the same for all other agents. This contradicts the assumption 
that Y is POREX\\l
We conclude that in case of the time-independent exponential utility 
functions and identically distributed total losses X t any POREX$  ^ is 
necessarily characterized by the same ratios of the marginal utilities for 
each year t  = 1,..., T and each pair of agents i,j e { 1 We  can rephrase 
it and say that the same linear combination of expected utilities should be 
maximized in each year.
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4.3b Sufficient conditions for a multiperiod POREX
In the Theorems 4.15 and 4.16 we have proved that, with appropriate 
constraints, the ratio of the marginal utilities in each year should be almost 
surely constant for all agents every year. The sufficient condition can be 
proved in both cases. Below we present the proof for the Pareto-optimality 
in terms of accumulated risks, as in the satisfaction criterion (4.9), but 
exactly the same reasoning can be applied to a POREX^j^  as well.
T h e o r e m  4 .1 7 . If R E X ^ t) Y  is such that for every i = 1 and t = 1, . . . ,  T 
the ratios of the derivatives of the utility functions are almost surely 
constant and do not change over time,
“ '•A r " ) = 0, a.s., (4.31)
then Y  is a POREXff Ratios 0, are strictly positive for every i = 1,...«.
Proof. □  Suppose, on the contrary, that Y  is not a POREX^ T). Then there 
exists another REX  ^^  ^  Y  such that for at least one agent j
V?(Y) = £  EM r , , ) ]  < V ? ( Y )  = £  E (4.32)
/= I t=  1
and for all other agents i,
Ff’(Y) = £  E[«„(y„)] < V?\Y) = £  E[»„(7„)]. (4.33)
1= I f=l
But from monotonous increase of the utility functions and their concavity, 
which implies that u\ > 0 and «"< 0 for every /, we can write that for each t,
Ui{Yit) < Ui{Yit) + u\{Ylt){Y, t -  Yit) a.s. (4.34)
or
■ < (Y„ -  Y„) a.s.
W/V//J
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From (4.31) u'it(Yit) = Qju\t(Y\ t), so we can write
E  < u\,(Yu) E  -  7") (4-35)
1 = 1  i=l
Because of the clearing condition the right-hand side equals 0,
E  < 0 a.s. (4.36)
1 = 1
Since (4.36) holds for each year t, we can write
E E  IE <  0>
r-l i-1
or
1=1 /=! f=l
In accordance with our assumption that Y  can be replaced with Y  thus 
improving some agents satisfaction and not impairing others’ utility 
functionals, all the numerators F,C2)(Y )-  fJ2)(Y) must be non-negative. But 
since the constants d, are all positive, (4.37) cannot hold. This contradiction 
shows that our assumption about Y was wrong and any multiperiod risk 
exchange with the same ratio of the derivatives of the utility functions is 
necessarily Pareto-optimal.■
The main results proved in Subsections 4.3a and 4.3b states that for both 
utility functionals (4.8) and (4.9), global risk exchanges are better than 
non-global ones, and for time-independent utility functions, multiperiod 
POREX can be represented as a one-period POREX under which the same
n
linear combination ^  aitE[uit(Yit)] is maximized at each step (additional
i=i
assumption for the utility functional (4.8) is that utility functions should be 
exponential). Sufficient condition also takes place: if the ratios of the 
derivatives of the utility functions are almost surely constant and do not 
change over time, w',(T/,) = 6iu\t{Y\ t) then Y is POREX.
113
4.4 Continuous Pareto-optimal risk exchanges
Assume now that the agents observe - and assess - their financial position 
continuously and not just at a finite set of time points. Denote the total 
income of agent A/, i = 1,..., n in the time interval (0, t] by Xu, t e [0,7]. Then 
X  = {X j i  = 1,... ,n, t e (0,7]} is the initial risk allocation within the group 
of n agents. The individual income processes X it generate the filtration 
F = {X t \;e[o,7] • The previous definitions and constraints of Section 4 on the 
multiperiod Pareto-optimal risk exchanges carry over to the continuous 
time set-up: admissible treaties are those satisfying clearing and
information conditions:
D e f i n i t i o n  4.18. Continuous risk exchange in the time interval (0,T] 
(REX{0Tf) Y  , is a set of random variables {T„}, i = \ , . . . , n ,  t e (0,7] 
satisfying the following conditions:
C o n d i t i o n  4.19 (information condition). The amounts exchanged at any 
moment t, Y  = {Yit\i = 1 can only depend on the information available 
at that time,
Yl t e X t, t g (0,7], (4.38)
that is, is adapted to F.
C o n d i t i o n  4 . 2 0  (clearing condition). The group involved in the continuous 
risk exchange is closed, which means that no money transactions with third 
parties are allowed,
E  Yu = E  Xu = X „  t e  (0,7]. (4.39)
/=! /=i
D e f i n i t i o n  4.21. A risk exchange Y = is called admissible  if
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£  Yi t = X t V t e  [0,7].
/=i
The set of all admissible risk exchanges is denoted as A{X).
The continuous time analogue to the utility functional as in (4.9) is
T
r ,(Y )  = E J u„(¥„)dt, (4.40)
t=0
with the superscript c for "continuous", and uit{(o) is the utility function of 
the agent A\ at time t. The Riemann integral (4.40) exists if the trajectories 
of the risk share processes Yit are bounded and continuous almost 
everywhere, so we make this additional assumption about the risk 
exchanges we are going to consider. This also imposes the constraint of 
boundedness and continuity almost everywhere on the total loss process X,.
We will show that the functional f^(Y) is concave. Indeed, for any
.. . A /  . /V
Z ,Z  g A{X), a e  [0,1] , a Z  + (1 -  a)Z  represents an admissible risk
exchange, since it obviously satisfies the information and clearing
. /v
conditions, so aZ  + (1 -  a)Z  e A(X). Because of the concavity of the utility 
functions uit we can write that its utility functional
v ; ( a Z + ( l  - a j Z )  =
T T
= E j u,t(aZt + (1 -  a)Z, )dt > E J auit(Z t ) + (1 -  a)uitZ t )dt =
o o
T  T ...
= E J auit(Z t )dt + E J (1 -  a)uitZ t )dt = aV^Z) + (1 -  a)F)Z. (4.41)
o o
It is not possible to construct a continuous analogue to the first satisfaction
T
criterion (4.8), the reason being that an object like J uu{dYu) is not
1=0
well-defined. Therefore, we will only use the definition (4.40). Also, we still 
assume that the utility functions are continuously differentiable. One 
example of such time-dependent utility function is ut(co) = ce~aoi~p,(see Aase
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(1999)), a being the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and p the time 
impatience rate.
The Pareto-optimality condition can be defined the following way:
D e f in i t io n  4.22. Continuous Pareto-optimal REXC{Q V[ Y , or POREX0^  Y  for 
the time period (0,7] is a risk exchange which cannot increase some agents’ 
satisfaction functional t f (Y )  defined by (5.3) without impairing other 
agents’ satisfaction:
VY : V*(Y) < Vj(Y),  Vi => V^Y) = V*(Y). (4.42)
The following properties can be formulated straight away:
P r o p o s i t io n  4.23. Let Y be a POREXc{0 V[. Then Y must be global, that is, at 
each time instant t, Yit should depend on the total losses Xt only. Proof is 
identical to that of Proposition 4.10.
Lem m a 4.24. Let Ybe a POREXc^0Ti. Then for any subinterval (OT2] ^  (0,7] 
Y  must be a POREXc^h t2y
Proof. □  The proof rests on the idea that, in case Y  is not a POREXc^t] for 
some subinterval (0 ,^ 2], then there exists another treaty Y which improves 
the satisfaction of at least one agent A\ on (OT2] without impairing other 
agents’ satisfaction. This risk exchange can then replace Y  on (OT2). The 
resulting new treaty Y, which is defined on (0,7] and coincides with Y on 
(t 1,^ 2) and with Y on [0,  ^1 ] and on 1/2,7], will improve A,’s satisfaction 
without diminishing the satisfaction of the other agents, and will, 
consequently, contradict our assumption about Pareto-optimality of Y M
Next we state the main result of this section: the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the continuous POREX for a group of n agents.
T h e o r e m  4 .25 . Suppose a REXfo^ Y={yJ1), . . . , ] /{")} is Pareto-optimal. Then 
for almost all moments t e (0,7], the ratio of the marginal utilities between 
the agents should be constant, and these constants must be the same for the
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whole period (0,7],
P r o o f . DTo prove this statement, we will need the well known
T h e o r e m  4.26. (Separability of the convex sets in the real linear space, 
from Aubin (2000)) Let M  and N  be two convex sets in the real linear space 
£, and the interior of at least one of them, say M, is not empty and does not 
intersect with N. Then there exists a non-trivial linear functional on £  
which separates M  and N.
To apply the theorem above, we need to specify the sets and the space we 
are working in. For every REXfo^Z e A (X ), the agents’ utility functionals 
have values F^Z ),..., Fj,(Z) correspondingly. We may view these values as 
a point in the n-dimensional space IR". By the same procedure, we may 
correspond a point from IR" to every admissible risk exchange. The image of 
the set A(X) after such mapping will be an (n -  1) -dimensional surface in 
(Rw. We will denote this set by 0(A). Now consider a subset of IR"
n = {(ttO),...,^")) : 0 < K® < FJ(Z), Z e A(X), i =  1,
It is the area between the coordinate hyperplanes in IR" and 0(A). The set 
n  is convex: if we take two points Tt = (7r(,), . .., 7T(w)) and n = (Jr^\... , k w ) 
from n, the area between these points belongs to n. Indeed, if 
0 < k W < m ( Z )  and 0 < n {,) < U®(Z) , Z,Z e 0(A), then
airW + (1 -  «)5r(,) < aVj(Z)  +(1 -  a)V^(Z) < Vj(aZ+(I -  a)Z).
  rss
Since aZ+{ 1 -  a)Z  e AiX), we have shown that an  + (1 -  a)n e n.
The second set required for the Theorem 4.26 is 
L =  { ( a ‘l>,...,<rW) :<r« » F)'(F), / = 1..................................  K d l ) } .
This set is obviously convex, and it does not intersect with n. Also, the 
interiors of both sets are not empty: the set Z contains, for example, an 
interior point (F^(Y) +1 ,...,Fjj(Y) +1), and the set II contains an interior
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point (F^(Y)/2 ,P^(Y) /2) .
Now Theorem 4.26 can be applied to the sets n, Z in 0&". The theorem states 
that there exists a set of the coefficients {c\,C2 , . .. ,c„} such that the linear
n
functional/  = f[x \,x i , ... ,x„) = Z  c/x, in R" separates n  and Z :
/=i
V(7r(l),...,7r(w)) g  n  and V(cr(1), . . g  Z the following inequality holds: 
2  C,7T(,) CiO^- (4.43)
/ = l  r =  1
Since (Fj(Y),..., Fj,(Y)) belongs to IT and the points 
(Fj(Y) + l ,r 2(Y),...,r„(Y)), (F;(Y),K2(Y )+ 1 , . . . , f;(Y)),
(Fj(Y), Fj,(Y),..., Fj,(Y) + 1) belong to Z, it follows from (4.6) that c, > 0,
/ = 1, 2 , . . . , a. As the functional is non-trivial, at least one c, > 0. We may 
assume without loss of generality that c\ > 0. As for any s > 0 
(^ (Y ) + 8 ,  Fj>(Y),..., K,(Y)) g  Z and therefore
£  c,K(Z) < c , e + t  c .r^ Y )  VZ g  ©(X),
/=i /=i
and by letting s \  0 we obtain
Z  ^ ( Y )  VZ G 0(X).
/=1 /=1
It shows that (Y4, (Y),..., Y)) maximizes the linear combination
n
^  c, Yj(Z) over the set ^4(X).
/=i
Finally, we will show that the same linear combination must be maximized 
almost everywhere on (0,7]. Since for every agent A,-, the
trajectories ult(Yit) are continuous almost everywhere, almost everywhere on 
(0,7] all n trajectories are continuous simultaneously. We denote by T the 
set of points at which every trajectory Ujt(Y,t), i = 1,... ,n is continuous.
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Now suppose that in some point t e T the risk shares EW;y(T„), z = 
fail to maximize the linear combination {c,}. Then, because of the 
continuity of each realization, it fails to do so in some 8 -neighbourhood of t, 
(t \ , t2 ), which contradicts Lem ma 4 .24 .
We have proved so far that continuous Pareto-optimal risk exchanges 
necessarily maximize the same linear combination at almost every time 
instant on (0,7]. We conclude with the sufficient part. Suppose some REXC
n
Z  maximizes 2^ biEujt(Yit) for almost all f e (0,7]. Then the integration from
/= 1
0 to T preserves this property, and the utility functionals Vj(Z) maximize
n
2^ bjV,(Z), which means that Z is Pareto-optimal.H
/=i
Summary
In Chapter 4, we have undertaken an attempt to extend the 
Pareto-optimality concept to the multiperiod and continuous setting. The 
two utility functionals proposed for the multiperiod model were
T T
k'I}(Y) =2Z E[ujt(vYjt)] and V™(Y) =2^ E[w,y(7„)]. The first one is based on
/=i ?=i
incremental risk shares while the second one involves cumulative risk 
parts. Other utility functionals can be studied as well, the weighted 
versions of V-' }(Y) and v f ‘ 1(Y) being the straightforward generalisation of the 
two functionals above. In this case, the theorems and proofs of Section 4.3 
can be carried on just the same.
We have shown that multiperiod POREX’s enjoy the following properties. 
First, they are global, that is, the individual risk shares depend on the total 
losses for that year only. Second, any multiperiod POREX must be 
Pareto-optimal for any subperiod of the initial time interval. Third, with 
some constraints, we have proved that multiperiod Pareto-optimal risk 
exchanges are those and only those which are Pareto-optimal in the
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Tone-period sense and maximise the same linear combination ^
t= \
at each time period.
T
The proposed continuous time utility functional is E J Uit { Y i t ) d t .  We have
t=o
proved in Section 4.4 that continuous Pareto-optimal risk exchanges on 
(0,7] are global, Pareto-optimal in the continuous sense on any subperiod of
T
(0,7] and necessarily maximize the same linear combination fliE[w,t(Yit)\
t= i
at almost every time instant on (0,7].
We conclude that the construction of the multiperiod and continuous 
POREX studied in Chapter 4 can actually be reduced to the one-period case. 
The agents must decide on the coefficients {#,} of the linear combination
T
ajE[uj,(Yi,)] beforehand and allocate the risk shares which maximize this
/ =  i
combination at each time instant.
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